ards in an affair of so much importance to our king and country, and that was the motive that induced me to send you the plan of operation dated the 24th inst.

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"As to the sixteen hundred men we desired from you, it was in order to land them from our ships, when we should think proper; and it is impossible that anybody else should be so good judges when to land them as we on board the ships. Their officers would no doubt come on board with them and would land with them."

Pepperrell, on getting this letter, called another council of his officers on June 1st. They then changed their views, and decided to send the six hundred men to man the "Vigilante," and also five hundred men with their officers to be disposed of as Commodore Warren saw fit and also that he should land his marines under McDonald as he had proposed. Their whole action from the beginning was but the result of mere provincial jealousy, of which they finally got the better.

Warren now put the "Vigilante" in commission, and offered the command very cordially to Captain Edward Tyng of the Colonial ship "Massachusetts," the senior officer of Pepperrell's flotilla, with the rank of post-captain in the Royal Navy. Tyng, however, declined it on account of his advanced age, and recommended Captain Rouse (of the "Shirley," Colonial ship), and it was given to him.*

Pepperrell's army at this time was in a bad way. He himself wrote Governor Shirley on June 2d, "that powder and balls were nearly used up, and many of his guns idle; that he had borrowed one hundred and eighty-seven barrels of powder from Commodore Warren, that his troops were greatly inferior to those of the enemy, that he had fifteen hundred sick, and that a reinforcement of three thousand men was absolutely necessary from the Colonies, who had an inadequate idea of the enemies' strength; that if it be possible to settle with Warren a general attack it would be done, but should the event bear heavily on the land forces they should only be able to act on the defensive part under cover of the ships."

^{*} Rev. T. Alden's Memoir of Edward Tyng.