

NATO

forces in Europe any longer a major threat. To concentrate a large part of our military resources in Europe would be a misdirection of effort, a slavery to mental attitudes appropriate to the past when western Europe may have lain open to possible attack.

Today the allied forces have 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons, a small fraction of which could devastate all of Europe. It is estimated that the Soviets have at least 1,000 such weapons. Any attack which might trigger a tactical nuclear exchange, let alone escalation to the use of strategical nuclear weapons, would again be madness. But in the rest of the world the instability caused by the gap between the rising expectation of newly independent people and their actual crushing poverty has caused conflicts and will cause more. The real danger lies in the fact that these conflicts may spread. It is not in Europe but in Asia that the tragic Viet Nam war has sapped the strength and strained the resources of the world's richest and most powerful country. It is in Africa that today an almost forgotten war goes on in which millions are threatened with extinction. Many conflicts in these areas are made additionally grave by racial hatreds.

Priority should therefore be directed to building a world community by putting the emphasis on the United Nations. This is low in the priorities of the Prime Minister but it has top priority with this party. In our view priority should be given to maintaining a highly mobile force, available for peacekeeping duties assigned by the United Nations. I know it is fashionable at the present time to downgrade the opportunities of such forces. In my judgment ample opportunities for valuable contribution in this field will inevitably recur. A mobile conventional contribution would be the most useful contribution that Canada could possibly make in Europe.

However, the major thrust of my remarks today is to make a plea to the government to clarify its stand on the proposal of the U.S.A. to deploy the A.B.M. system. This is primarily, of course, a United States decision. It is nevertheless one of vital importance to the world as a whole. Canada, as an ally, surely has the right to be heard in the debate which is going on in the United States and upon which so much depends. I would urge the government to make it clear that Canada wishes no part under NORAD or otherwise in such an A.B.M. system.

[Mr. Brewin.]

My reason for this is not because I do not believe that Canada should not be willing to contribute to United States security as part of the security of North America. It is rather because of my conviction that the proposed system contributes absolutely nothing to the security of North America or the world. Precisely the reverse is the case. It is my submission that the proposed A.B.M. system, whether in its thin or heavy form, as the jargon goes, whether a Sentinel system as proposed by the Johnson administration or the modified Safeguard system as proposed by the Nixon administration, represents a new step in what Mr. MacNamara described as "the mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry."

• (5:50 p.m.)

What, briefly, is the nature of this proposed system? I will confine myself to the modified Safeguard system. It is estimated to cost between \$6 billion and \$7 billion. It is designed to protect the land-based retaliatory forces of the U.S.A. against a direct Soviet attack, to provide area defence to the United States against possible Chinese attack, and to protect against accidental launchings.

Phase one—they have phases in their American jargon dealing with these matters—will cover two large missile sites located in Montana and North Dakota. These are expected to be completed, if approved by Congress, in 1973. These bases will consist of 400 to 600 long-range Spartan missiles and short-range Spring defensive missiles.

There are a number of reasons why this system should be regarded as a colossal waste of money. The first is the question of whether it can be effective to protect either the American strategic missile sites or, second, American cities and the American population against nuclear attack.

It should be emphasized that neither President Nixon nor anyone else has ever suggested that the system, no matter how much it is expanded, can possibly afford any protection to cities or population against a Soviet attack. So far as protection of the missile sites is concerned, the fact is that the American offensive deterrent is so massive and so dispersed that it needs no such protection, and aside from the two Minutemen bases which contain 350 missiles will not receive any such protection.

The American strategic deterrent—and I am sure the Minister of National Defence