

Mr. Gillespie: Surely you would have to go back to the basic assumption that you are making about the kind of world order within which we have to make our policy. The kind of world order that you seem to be foreseeing is one that would be better preserved if there were no military alliances.

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. Gillespie: You start from that position and then you follow through and say we should get rid of NATO and then you follow through logically and say Canada should withdraw from NATO because this will help to bring NATO down.

Professor McNaught: You are moving. . .

Mr. Gillespie: You can see the argument from one point and I am turning it on you and saying that it has to be related to the kind of goals and the kind of world order within which you foresee Canadian policy being made.

Professor McNaught: I quite agree. I think in return for this kind of policy one should bargain for concessions in Berlin, the settlement of the German question. Certainly it should not be done as a merely naive and isolated unrelated kind of action. But I say that to anticipate the disbanding of NATO as it presently exists is to offer ourselves a flexibility of approach and initiative that we do not have within it.

Mr. Gillespie: But thinking again in terms of the world order argument, is it not more likely that the balance of power, the stability, the predictability of actions of others will be better preserved around an alliance system?

Professor McNaught: That, of course. . .

Mr. Gillespie: I am not now arguing Canada's position. I am arguing the alliance system which you were arguing also earlier, I think.

Professor McNaught: I think the history of alliances is such as to give me no confidence whatsoever in their ability to preserve world order, but precisely the reverse, and the history of Schmidt and Bernstein and others of the alliance structure that led to the first World War, which was very similar in nature to the alliance structure that has grown up today, is such as to persuade me that they lead to arms races, they lead to fear, they lead to militarism and they lead, in fact, to all those things that threaten stability rather than create it.

Mr. Gillespie: So long as there is certainty about the response, they do not need to do the very things that you have been talking about, and surely this is one of the things that NATO has provided—the certainty of response.

Professor McNaught: May I give you one quick historical illustration? In 1911 and 1912 Sir Winston Churchill at the Admiralty had Sir Eyre Crowe draw up a plan of naval action and of rapid deployment of British military forces to France in the event of a breakdown, and he said in the Crowe Memorandum that this was a system of massive and instant and known retaliation which would make certain that there would be no attack upon France. I do not really see the certainty of retaliation; that was, in fact, disbelieved by Germany and I think there is exactly the same kind of credibility gap today between the alliance systems.

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Mr. Gillespie: I would have thought that might have happened if Cuba had gone the other way. I suggest to you the very fact that the United States were prepared to meet the threat of Cuba and to risk the world holocaust at that time has increased the credibility of NATO and the certainty of response.

Professor McNaught: I take, I am afraid, a different point of view about what happened in Cuba. It seems to be borne out by everything fresh we learn about it, including Robert Kennedy's latest publication, that essentially in the last analysis, since the United States did in fact commit an act of war in imposing an embargo on Cuba, the peace of the world depended upon the good sense of Mr. Khrushchev in not trying to overcome that embargo.

In other words, there was a credibility gap both ways there and I do not think that the fear of instant retaliation was such that it prevented President Kennedy at that time from undertaking an act of war.

Mr. Gillespie: Would you agree that the whole history of these alliances and the reason they have broken down is because there has been uncertainty about the resolve within the alliances to back up the alliance when the crunch comes.

It seems to me, anything we may do inadvertently or as a matter of policy which tends to weaken the idea that NATO will respond, depreciates the value of NATO as a factor in maintaining the balance of power.

Professor McNaught: I disagree. It seems to me the more complex and massive the system of the alliance becomes the more dangerous it becomes. One historical example you will recall is the crisis over the shooting of the Archduke at Sarajevo in 1914 when certain members of the various alliances began to make preparations against the possibility that there would be war. One of the preparations made, of course, was the sending by the Czar of very large numbers of troops to the border. The difficulty was