

we felt that this supervisory agency might consist of nations which do not belong to the communist bloc and which did not participate in military operations in Korea.

Fifth, arrangements should be made for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea by stages, that withdrawal to be completed in a short period, to be fixed by the conference, after the post-election all-Korean government had begun effectively to function; in other words, withdrawal might begin at once by both sides and be completed within a short time after the Korean government had begun to function.

Sixth, a reaffirmation of international responsibility under the United Nations to participate in the relief and rehabilitation of Korea through economic and material assistance. Finally, an international guarantee under the auspices of the United Nations of the territorial integrity of unified, free and democratic Korea.

It was hoped that some kind of proposal based on principles of that nature might be put forward as coming from all sixteen powers. That procedure has not yet been possible, Mr. Chairman, but we are very close in our views. Indeed, as a result of negotiations between the delegations on our side, all sixteen powers are very close together now on what constitutes the principles for a good Korean settlement.

Meanwhile, the government delegation of the Republic of Korea has put forward its own proposals for a settlement. We think that these are acceptable as a basis of negotiation but we have doubts about one or two of the points included in their proposals, more particularly that which would give to South Korea a veto on the election in that part and their insistence that all Chinese troops be out of Korea before the six-months period would end. We feel now--and this is the attitude we are taking at Geneva where the matter is being debated this afternoon--that these proposals on the communist side and the proposals on our side should go to a small negotiating committee. If that suggestion is followed, we shall soon be able to find out whether progress is possible.

It would be unwise to be too optimistic on that score. We therefore ask ourselves what should be done if, at this Korean conference at Geneva, we cannot succeed in bringing about the unification of that unhappy land. I think it would be wise, under these circumstances, to suspend, not to terminate, the conference and to agree to look at the problem again some months ahead when conditions might be a little bit different. I think it would also be wise if this conference, in some form, could confirm armistice arrangements which would remain in effect until a peace settlement becomes possible.

I admit that we are still far short of the achievement of a peaceful solution of the Korean question. It is an intensely difficult problem and we shall need a large fund of patience if an acceptable solution is to be attained; but there is still hope that such a solution will eventually be attained. Meanwhile I feel--