

effectively as on the occasion when there was no Soviet delegation present. Furthermore, the Security Council has been meeting since these walkouts occurred.

The situation in regard to recognition of communist China and its effect on the United Nations was referred to by the leader of the opposition the other evening when he said that only two proponents of recognition were now in the Security Council, and only three in the other agencies of the United Nations. As a matter of fact the situation is that in the general assembly of the United Nations there are fifteen members who have recognized communist China. Of the eleven members of the Security Council, five have recognized communist China. Of the twelve members of the Atomic Energy Commission, five have recognized the government of communist China. In the Economic and Social Council seven have recognized it; in the International Labour Office, seventeen; in the Food and Agricultural Organization, sixteen and so on. More members of the United Nations have taken this step than was indicated the other evening by the leader of the opposition.

The fact is that in some of these agencies we are approaching a position where a majority of the members concerned may be representatives of governments which have recognized the new government of communist China. If we reach that position in fact, those states which have not concurred in such recognition will be confronted by a very difficult situation indeed. If we find ourselves in the minority, should we walk out? Of course that would be absurd; but if we do not walk out and we do not recognize communist China, then the alternative is to remain there and work with delegations from communist China, and by so doing give them a form of recognition. All this shows how complicated and difficult the problem is.

In his remarks the other evening the leader of the opposition stated, with great emphasis, great eloquence and great impressiveness, I thought, that we had to stem the Red tide in Asia. Well, so we do; but how? When he attempted to answer that question I venture to suggest that he got into the same kind of difficulty I often get into when I make general statements and then try to follow them up with concrete observations. He did say, however, that in answering that question we should not fall into the language of diplomatic mumbo-jumbo. I entirely agree with that. When he attempted to answer that very important question himself he set out certain things which I might just mention--and I hope I am putting them correctly.

First he said there should be no hasty recognition. I entirely agree; and I do not think we can be accused of undue haste in this matter. He said that recognition should not be granted until certain conditions were fulfilled, and those conditions he enumerated in his statement. I think the most important one--and I hope I am quoting him correctly--was that there shall be common action, that there shall be a clear and universal pattern of strategy which will be known to the people of the free nations, and which will be known in the clearest detail to the nations which threaten our peace and security. Certainly, he went on to state, there should be no recognition of the Mao regime until those conditions are fulfilled.

Well it is going to be a little difficult at this date to agree on a common policy, which was a condition he suggested before we could give recognition; because no such common policy is possible as long as some of the states out in that portion of the world have already recognized communist China. On that point the hon. gentleman quoted from a statement of Mr. Anthony