

## SECURITY

The study has also found that there was a direct relation between the administrative workload of Canada-based officers at a mission and the security requirements of that mission, both procedural and physical. Geographic Branch ADM's must therefore be made aware of the impact that the processing and storage of classified information will have on Canada-Based program staff, when new missions are opened or existing ones are downsized. It is probable that in many cases, the mandate of the mission is such that there may not be a requirement for a sensitive area and a secure zone within the Chancery. The need for special security shells, doors and walls and security related equipment should therefore be based upon "Programme needs" and a Threat and Risk Assessment. By not having a sensitive area or secure zone, this would enable LES selected by Heads of Mission with an enhanced reliability check(ERC) to work in the chancery even in the absence of Canada-based staff. This would also mean that a wide array of security related reports would no longer be required. To the extent that specified missions could operate without communications above the level of **PROTECTED**, this would mean considerable savings for the Department.

In addition to ensuring that a sound assessment of the secure communication needs of small missions being established is done, a thorough review of the secure communication requirements of existing small missions needs to be conducted by ISS and the geographic branches concerned in order to keep to a minimum the secure communication equipment and the related infrastructure that serve to protect the equipment.

Since all recommended security measures must be based upon a Threat and Risk Assessment, it is important that Heads of Mission be sensitized to the implications of its content as this will determine whether the Head of Mission is prepared to accept the residual risk to his and her programmes in exchange for the cost savings involved in reduced security. It is the responsibility of ISS to ensure that Heads of Mission and Assistant Deputy Ministers are sensitized to the costs and responsibilities associated with the installation of security related infrastructure as more small missions are being created.

Heads of Missions can now grant LES with enhanced reliability checks (ERC) the right to open and close the chancery. Although this latitude is now reflected in the new Manual of Security Instructions, all missions concerned should be informed so they can take the appropriate steps to obtain ERCs for selected LES.

Another way to alleviate the burden of small missions is by ensuring that Regional Security Officers (RSO's) take a more active role in helping small missions in the preparation of the personal safety contingency planning and local standing security orders. For example, when a small mission is established, the RSO should travel to that mission within the first three to six months in order to assist with the preparation of those documents. Also, efforts should continue to be made to ensure that all small missions are part of the American or British contingency plan.

Finally, Security Managers should assume a formal regional role by assisting small missions in carrying out their security related duties, where the small mission has a high security threat. This would include changing Chancery combinations on an annual basis, assessing local security companies, ensuring that staff quarters meet security standards and conducting ERC follow-up enquiries. With the expansion of the role of the Military Security Guards, Hub missions may require supplementary funds to cover the travel expenses of the military security guards.