

safeguards, for example as cash and in-kind contributions to research and development expenses, have helped to hold down the official safeguards budget. More significantly, the financing of safeguards has been placed under a special regime, in which 36 states pay 98 per cent of the expenses. This reflects, in part perhaps, the principle that richer states should pay more, but it also reflects the greater interest of some states in the Agency's safeguards activities.

Both the special financing regime and the use of extrabudgetary contributions present problems. Although one might say that safeguards serve the whole community, the special funding provisions, argues Schiff, reinforce the perception of safeguards as the concern of a particular constituency.¹ The specific problem of dual constituencies in a chemical weapons verification agency could, of course, be overcome by restricting the functions of that body to verification alone. More generally, the IAEA's problems with financing safeguards points to the need for a strong agreement not just on the functions of an agency but also on the principles for its financing.

Extrabudgetary contributions may be a response to the particular politics of safeguards financing, but they have broader implications for safeguards as well. Their use suggests the Agency's resource weakness — in financial, personnel and research terms — as compared to the resources of major states and other actors in the nuclear sector. It must co-operate with these other actors, as must be expected and as is healthy, but it may also depend on them for information and assistance. Reliance on extrabudgetary contributions merely underlines such dependence. As a result, the Agency could be affected in its various support services for its safeguards operations by what these contributors believe should be the main areas of effort.

A chemical weapons verification agency would probably face difficulties imposed by the parsimony of major contributors and by its connection to the chemical industry: it would not have the base needed to be fully independent of states in devising safeguards in response to changing conditions and technology. If the chemical area is more dynamic than the nuclear area, an agency would be even more dependent on close co-operation, outside help and thus outside judgements.

Personnel Policies²

An international verification organization must have a staff which can on the one hand operate with freedom from crippling national interference yet on the other retain the confidence of states. Some of the personnel problems that may arise are addressed here, as being linked directly to state-Agency relations, but others are dealt with below.