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of their relationship and their times, Knowlton Nash explores both the personal and the substantive reasons for their distrust of one another, and analyses the effects of their personal differences on relations between the two countries.

Diefenbaker and Kennedy were completely different personalities and neither had much respect for the attributes of the other. Diefenbaker loved the House of Commons, and the cut and thrust of debate. He revelled in campaigning and grand speeches. He was effective in Opposition but, once in power, dithered and found decisions difficult. Kennedy was the opposite; while a member of the US Senate, he had given at best perfunctory attention to it. Campaigning was only a means to an end. What he loved was to govern, to exercise the levers of power in order to further his ideas.

Diefenbaker revered Dwight Eisenhower, and from 1957 through 1960, relations between the two countries were friendly and cordial. Indeed, the seeds of later discontent might have been sown in those early days of the Diefenbaker government when the NORAD agreement was signed with what seemed in retrospect to have been undue haste.

Many of the subsequent irritants during the Kennedy years focused on arming with nuclear warheads the Bomarc missiles already in place in North Bay and La

to Nash, Diefenbaker vacillating between acceptance and denial. Howard Green, the Minister of External Affairs, was very active at the UN and on issues of disarmament, and counselled against acquiring nuclear weapons; Douglas Harkness, the Minister of National Defence, was equally convinced that we should live up to what he thought was our commitment to accept them. Kennedy supported the latter view, but more than anything else, wanted a decision, and grew increasingly irritated by Diefenbaker's refusal to make one.

The book is full of interesting bits of information, including details about the so-called lost memo of Kennedy's which Diefenbaker found and locked away in a safe, and the famous State Department release of January 1963 which set out American views of the state of negotiations between Canada and the US on nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker seized the release to claim American interference in Canadian affairs, an issue which he used during the subsequent election campaign.

Nash has written an accessible and compelling account both of the times and the protagonists, and in the course of so doing has demonstrated that personal chemistry is indeed an important factor in the conduct of foreign policy.

— Nancy Gordon

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refugee camp in Beirut, during its intermittent besieging by Amal (a Lebanese Shi'ite militia) from 1985 to 1987. The longest of these sieges lasted for nine months causing the 2,500 inhabitants of Shatila to suffer extreme shortages of food, water, electricity, space and hope.

Six months of incessant military bombardment by tanks and howitzers pummelled the tiny camp into a pile of dust, sending the residents into cramped and dirty subterranean shelters. The camp's defenders also went underground, digging tunnels around Shatila's perimeter to continue their defence foxhole-style. Unable to overrun Shatila's rubble militarily, Amal resorted to psychological and starvation tactics for three more months in the hopes of bringing the camp to its knees. And still, Shatila's resistance held, the question is how?

Giannou's perspective is hardly non-partisan, but neither is it sentimental or uncritical. He was not only an observer of events, but was also an active participant, playing a key role in the camp's internal politics and external resistance. His importance stemmed from his skill as a surgeon and his position as director of the camp's only functioning institution, the hospital, which itself became a prime target of Amal attacks.

Giannou and the hospital also played an important role in the camp's inter-factional political

rapprochement. Within Shatila, there were five major Palestinian political factions as well as other minor dissident groups, all of which were more or less at war with each other. Of course, the siege necessitated Palestinian internal cooperation and coordination in order for them to withstand the onslaught. The hospital, as a camp-wide, Palestinian institution provided the meeting ground and Giannou acted as political liaison.

While Giannou's analysis, as he states in his preface, is not an "academic treatise," he has an exceptional grasp of the political intricacies of Palestinian and Middle Eastern politics. As participant-observer Giannou provides us with the personalities of the faction leaders, and the reasons behind their actions, and thus renders the events more comprehensible to the outsider.

This comprehension is important because what happened inside Shatila between 1985 and 1987 both contributed to and was a reflection of the wider Palestinian rapprochement which paved the way for eruption of the *Intifadah* in the Occupied Territories. The symbolic significance of a united Palestinian resistance to the terrors of siege in Lebanon was not lost on their brethren in the Territories.

Lurking beneath the book's matter-of-fact style of writing is a simmering anger. Both in his book and in person, Giannou's pointed, judgemental words could be mistaken for arrogance, but this would be to miss their meaning. It is not from self-importance that Giannou condemns. Rather, the anger is drawn from the devastating experiences which forged his profoundly humane sense of what is wrong with our world.

— Deirdre Collings

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