

There was little initial commentary on the establishment of revolutionary power in the party, academic and military press. In clear contrast to the Nicaraguan case, the Soviet Union failed to recognize the regime until October 1979, six months after the revolution. That relations were opened at all apparently had a great deal to do with Cuban support of Grenadian overtures, rather than with any conspicuous Soviet enthusiasm for ties with the new regime.⁸⁸ The record of interstate and interparty relations suggests, as Shearman notes, that it was Grenada that wooed a reluctant Soviet Union, rather than vice versa. The Soviet response, in Jacobs' words, was "maddeningly slow".⁸⁹

The first official Grenadian delegation visited the Soviet Union in May 1980, where they met with Boris Ponomarev, the head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. This was followed by the signature of a bilateral trade agreement in June 1980, and of a limited agreement in military aid in July of the same year.⁹⁰

As the Soviets developed greater knowledge of and confidence in their Grenadian suitors, the relationship broadened. In a 1981 protocol, the two governments agreed to a further arms transfer valued at 5 million roubles. The first major Grenadian governmental delegation was dispatched to the Soviet Union in July 1982. At that time the two sides signed an interparty agreement, suggesting a growing Soviet recognition of the credentials of the Grenadian Revolution and a limited Soviet commitment to deepening it.⁹¹

They also agreed on additional cooperation in matters of trade, technology, planning and culture. There was at this time a further arms agreement, this one envisaging the supply of a further 10 million roubles of material. By 1983, the Soviets were apparently sufficiently happy about the course of events in Grenada that they were willing in private conversation to acknowledge the NJM as a communist party and Grenada itself to be a "state of socialist orientation".⁹²

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 201. On this point, see also P. Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Grenada Under the New Jewel Movement", *International Affairs* LXI, #4 (Winter 1985/86).

⁸⁹ Jacobs, *op. cit.* (note 86), p. 201.

⁹⁰ The agreement envisaged the delivery "without charge" of "special and other equipment" of a value of 4 million roubles. Shearman, *op. cit.* (note 88).

⁹¹ For the text of the agreement, see Seabury and McDougall, *op. cit.* (note 76), pp. 45-6.

⁹² Jacobs, *op. cit.* (note 86), pp. 198-9.