



the Soviet Union to adopt a more open attitude to many aspects of military information; such information should be regarded as a more matter-of-fact, straightforward, everyday area of interest rather than as an emanation of highly sensitive national policy.

From the beginning of the Conference there were two very different conceptions evident in the approaches adopted by the West and the East. The Soviet Union and its allies attempted to promote what might be called a declaratory conception of security, favouring high-level governmental statements and declarations outlining certain goals and prescribing certain forms of activity, but in terms that would be neither specific nor verifiable. For its part, the West (and this view was very largely shared by the Neutral and Non-Aligned group of nations) argued that confidence and trust must be built rather than declared; openness in military affairs, the West contended, would only come about as a consequence of specific cooperative actions undertaken by all participating states together or in smaller groups. Thus, in the very early days of the Conference, the Alliance presented a package of concrete measures which dealt in specific terms with the modalities for such activities as notification, observation and verification, among others. It is this action-oriented rather than declaration-oriented approach that is so clearly reflected in the Stockholm negotiation's outcome.

Any negotiation represents, of course, a bargain between two or more partners, and it is wise to bear this in mind in looking at the Stockholm results.

Despite the presentation of proposals for measures of an essentially declaratory nature, the Soviets and their allies entered into the Stockholm negotiations quite probably with very minimal specific demands. From the collection of declaratory proposals proposed by Eastern negotiators in the early stages of the Conference, only one found expression in the final outcome. This was the principle of the non-use of force. In actual fact, the section on the non-use of force in the Stockholm Docu-

ment is a very long way from the treaty which the East had originally proposed and which it will probably continue to put forward in other forums in the future. Some contend that the inclusion of this section in the Stockholm Document gives a semblance of legitimacy to the East's political and declaratory approach to security. Even if this is minimally true, it should be borne in mind that the non-use of force principle is a central feature of the West's view of international relations, and that the language in the Stockholm Document is Western rather than Eastern in spirit and in manner of presentation. It is clear beyond doubt that no governmental decisions will be taken nor policies adopted on the basis of this non-use of force text which are not consistent with Western interests as a whole.

Rather than winning general acceptance for their specific ideas — which they almost certainly knew would not be the case — what the Soviets and their allies were seeking at Stockholm was a move towards the establishment, on a more or less regular basis, of a forum for the constant or at least regular review of the security situation in Europe in a way that would give the Soviet Union a major voice. The establishment of an essentially political rather than military pan-European security conference has been a long-standing objective of Soviet foreign policy. Whether this goal will be fully satisfied in the future remains to be seen, but clearly it would have been impossible for Moscow even to seek to pursue it further if the Stockholm Conference had resulted in a failure or an outcome which had not been consistent with Western interests or demands.

For their part, the Allies achieved much substantive satisfaction at Stockholm; the Stockholm Document is an immensely detailed prescription for concrete activities and measures aimed at promoting confidence and greater security as an essential first step towards more stringent arms control and even eventual reductions. The Stockholm result comes close in very many respects to the initial package of measures the West tabled in January

1984 and the result could, if the measures are honestly implemented, induce more openness and predictability in military activities in Europe. This could in turn help to reduce one advantage that the East has traditionally enjoyed: secrecy. The problem of asymmetry has bedevilled almost all arms control, disarmament and security negotiations since World War II. Information that is readily accessible in the media in the West is generally regarded as highly classified in Eastern Europe. The programme of activities agreed to at Stockholm should go some distance towards reducing this asymmetry even though it may not eliminate it.

But this is only a first step towards a larger and more important objective. In all realism it must be noted that while an atmosphere of confidence is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for arms control, the results of Stockholm *per se* will hardly affect other advantages enjoyed by the East: more troops and more tanks, the advantages of geography and a military doctrine based on the concept of offence.

In assessing the basic components of the Stockholm Document and the balance of advantages inherent in the outcome, it must be emphasized that the whole complex bargain exists at the moment on paper; the ultimate success or failure of the negotiation will depend on how scrupulously the measures themselves are implemented — and this is a process that will take time.

Two questions come to mind immediately: how will the East's implementation of these undertakings be monitored, and, on the other side of the same coin, how will we ourselves in the West organize our own implementation activities? We, like the East, have undertaken some biting new commitments. If the process of confidence-building is recognized as a mutual and reciprocal one, it will be important that we establish a high level of credibility in our willingness to implement the Stockholm provisions accurately. At the same time, the conclusion cannot be avoided that it will be a much more exacting task to monitor the East's implementation of the