As a result of its experience in a variety of United Nations peace-keeping situations, Canada has evolved a set of criteria for the effective functioning of any peacekeeping force, whether or not Canada is invited to participate. First, the establishment of a peacekeeping operation should be linked to an agreement by the parties to negotiate a settlement, preferably within a defined period of time. Without movement towards "peacemaking", a peacekeeping force may eventually contribute to a perpetuation of the problem, as the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs noted in his address to the General Assembly earlier this year.

A peacekeeping force should be responsible to a political authority, preferably the Security council of the United Nations, and this authority should receive reports and have adequate powers to supervise the mandate of the force. Canada's peacekeeping experience has extended beyond participation in missions of the United Nations - such as the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indochina - but we have found that United Nations operations stand a greater chance of success, and we prefer them accordingly.

The question of command, control and supervision of peacekeeping forces within the United Nations are of vital importance. As a troop contributor, Canada considers it desirable that the Secretary-General should be in a position to direct peacekeeping operations under the broad authority of the Security Council and that he should appoint the Commander, after consulting the parties to the conflict and the Security Council. Such a system would combine the maximum of efficiency with flexibility.

A peacekeeping force should have a clear mandate, adequate to permit it to carry out its assigned functions, including provision for freedom of movement. The lack of a clear mandate, or an inadequate one, can seriously interfere in the continued effective operation of a force.

A crucial prerequisite for a peacekeeping mission is that all the parties to a conflict accept the presence of the force and agree to maintain a ceasefire. A United Nations group, whether an observer mission or a larger interpositional force, would not be able to operate effectively if one or more parties refused to accept the presence of a United Nations force or to honour a ceasefire. As far as Canada itself is concerned, we extend the concept of the acceptability of a force as a whole to the national contingents involved therein. Canadian participation in a force must be acceptable to all concerned, and this shoud be equally valid for other potential troop contributors. In return, host states must give all members of the force equal treatment and respect.

I would also like to draw attention to the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations. If the contributors to peacekeeping operations are to be widely representative of the membership, as they should be, the membership should be prepared to accept the costs. A system of voluntary contributions is demoralizing because it leads to indifference and cynicism. Only certain countries can afford to contribute troops in these conditions. All states have a responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and all must contribute financially to this end, taking into account their capacity to pay, just as they do to other activities of benefit to all.