

views by comparing them with those of Bishop Berkeley, and as Berkeley is the sole metaphysician of modern times whom he admits to have made an approximation to truth, it may not be useless or out of place to notice the relation in which the system of the Institutes stands to that expounded in the "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," and in the "Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge." Berkeley did not aspire to frame a necessary theory of knowledge. He limited himself to the knowledge of which we are the subjects; and this is, in fact, urged in the Institutes as the main defect of his philosophy. "Berkeley's system," we are told, "was invalidated by a fundamental weakness, which was 'this, that it was rather an exposition of the contingent structure 'of *our* knowledge than an exposition of the necessary structure of *all* knowledge.' And on this account 'his Ontology,' it is added, 'breaks down; for his conclusion is, that the subject and object 'together, the synthesis of mind and the universe, is what alone 'truly and absolutely exists or can exist.'" Berkeley considered the objects of perception to be sensible qualities; and it was an essential point in his doctrine that these are incapable of existing except in a mind. He made no distinction in this respect between what are termed the secondary qualities of matter—taste, warmth, colour, audible sound, and so forth—and those which have been called primaries—extension, figure, motion, &c. The extension, figure, &c., which we perceive, are in the mind as truly, and in the same manner, as the warmth, the sweetness, the redness, or the sound which we perceive. Berkeley has often been represented as denying the real existence of sensible things: but he himself repeatedly and vehemently protests against the imputation. The real existence of sensible things is, he says, incontrovertible; but they do not exist apart from the mind. Their *esse* is *percipi*. Must not matter however, an unthinking, inactive substance, be assumed as the substratum of sensible qualities? Berkeley answers that such a substratum is inconceivable. Nay, the conception of it which we are asked to form, involves a contradiction: for sensible qualities being incapable of existing out of a mind, how can they, without contradiction, be spoken of as existing in an unthinking substratum, that is, in what is not mind? But granting that nothing besides sensible qualities is perceived; and that the existence of matter, as a substratum of sensible qualities, is an absurdity; may we not still believe in matter as the cause or occasion or instrument of our perceptions? Berkeley examines this question very minutely; and endeavours to show that in any meaning which we are able to affix to