

perience of 1866, partly acting on their military instincts, adopted new tactics and met the fresh requirements. They quickly refuted the arguments that had found favor with a great many military men, that the improved arms would give so undue a pre-eminence to the defensive, that war would resolve itself into war of posts. On the contrary they took the initiative with bold attacks, only in place of manœuvring in masses, or even in line with skirmishers in front, they adopted an extended order for their successive waves of attack, thus giving the men the free use of their weapons, and allowing the rapidity of loading characterizing the breech-loader to have full scope. They instilled into their soldiers the necessity of economizing their ammunition, and of closing with the enemy, not in the old sense with the bayonet, but in order to make every shot tell from their comparatively short ranging rifle. In their instructions they laid special stress on what has been translated as fire discipline, teaching their men to act individually, or in small bodies in extended order with the same steadiness as when in close order under the eye of their col. The steady discipline and the instruction in their profession of every grade from the general to the private, and especially of the regimental officers, produced admirable results. The French, relying on their long range rifle, firing rapidly rather than carefully, and trusting to the defensive, contrary to the traditions of their army and the aptitude of their soldiery, were beaten; and although many other causes may have contributed to their defeat, yet those here given, together with the laxer discipline of the men and the inferior military education of the officers, were some of the principal reasons which led to the success of the Germans and the destruction of the armies of what had hitherto been considered the most military nation of the continent. What then do we learn from the history of this war? That with the introduction of the breech-loader, more stringent discipline, greater steadiness, and individual intelligence, is required from the men, and more careful study is demanded from the officers, especially from those of the lower grades, on whom increased responsibility will devolve. If we march with the age in military as well as other matters, we need not fear evil results from the introduction of the breech-loader. The steadiness of our Infantry which has recently received such praise from a French military writer. I allude to General Trochu's quotations from Marshal Dugrand's opinions, will stand us in good stead. The terrible fire for which in old wars they had been famous, will still characterize them when they have to use the new improved weapons. Only we must adopt modern ideas in regard to tactics, remembering that fighting in extended order does not mean looseness in drill, but rather increased steadiness and greater submission to discipline, and that rapidly and accurately shooting rifles are not intended to encourage quick and careless firing, but rather economy of ammunition and a desire never to throw away a shot. The men must be taught that when once launched forward to the attack, there is no retreat. They must advance rapidly over the ground swept by the enemy's fire, the supports and reserves, to use the old terms, closing on the advanced line as it approaches the enemy, filling up the gaps and adding the strength and impetus to the final rush. If so handled, the rapidly loaded breech-loader will do much to restore to the attack the advantage which accurately shooting muzzle loaders

had given to the defence, whilst it will secure to the Infantry the pre-eminence it has long held in modern armies. I venture merely to throw out these hints, taken mostly from recently published German words on the last war, for the consideration of those who are interested in military matters, and who seek a solution for the many questions which the recent changes in weapons have given rise to among all who study military history. I do not apologize for these remarks, as although I am addressing a literary and scientific audience, I know that among them are many who have devoted their time, their energy, and their knowledge to strengthening the defensive power of their native country by service in the ranks of her noble constituted arm, the Militia of Canada, and consequent will be able to appreciate any remarks that I may have made on military subjects."

On the conclusion of the lecture a vote of thanks was proposed by Lieut.-Col. Powell and seconded by Dr. VanCortlandt it is hardly necessary to say that the proposition was cordially adopted. The gallant colonel briefly acknowledged this mark of appreciation, and then exhibited to such of the audience as remained the several rifles he had at hand to illustrate his subject.—*Free Press.*

## THE ASHANTEE WAR.

### THE FIRST ENCOUNTER.

The following is Sir Garnet Wolseley's official report of the first encounter with the enemy, which took place on Oct. 14.—The despatch is published in the London papers of Nov. 19.

Cape Coast Castle, }  
October 15, 1873. }

SIR,—I have the honor to inform you that a column—namely, twenty nine Blue jackets, with one seven pounder gun, one rocket trough, twenty Royal Marine Artillery, 129 Royal Marine Light Infantry, 205 Second West India Regiment, 126 Houssas, ten armed police, thirty axemen, and 270 carriers—marched yesterday from Elmina, under command of Lieutenant Col. Wood, V. C., and destroyed the disaffected villages of Essaman, Amquana, Akimfoo, and Ampenee. I accompanied the column, in order to make it plain to the natives that I am sent here, not to administer the Government, but as a general officer to command Her Majesty's troops, and that I intend personally to take part in all military operations. I had resolved to destroy these villages, because I had for some time known that they were occupied by detachments of the Ashantee forces, and that their inhabitants were in league with the enemy. Our officers could not go to any distance from Elmina without being insulted and threatened with attack, and I had the best authority for knowing that the large force of Ashantees in camp at Mampon drew their supplies through these villages. I had summoned their chiefs to present themselves at Elmina. They, however, had not only refused to come, but sent insulting answers, to which they were prompted by the Ashantees at Mampon, who told them that the Ashantees were more courageous than the English, that the English would not dare to march into the bush to attack the villages, and that even should they do so, the Ashantees would come to the help of the chiefs. In order to surprise the vil-

lages and prevent any reinforcements arriving from Mampon, I carefully spread false intelligence that I was about to move with a force in another direction, on the night of the 13th, and I gave nearly two days for the news to reach the enemy.—The ruse was entirely successful. There is every reason to believe the enemy were completely surprised, and the distance between Mampon to Essaman made it impossible for the Ashantees to reinforce Essaman in time without previous warning. As soon as I had decided on my plan I invited the co-operation of the Senior Naval Officer, who held in readiness the Royal Marines and Blue jackets above specified, and landed an officer and forty two blue jackets at Cape Coast, and an officer and twenty blue jackets at Elmina, to garrison those places during the temporary absence of the troops. The detachment, Second West India Regiment, embarked on board Her Majesty's ships *Decoy*, on the evening of the 13th, and I embarked with some of my staff on board Her Majesty's ship *Barracouta* at nine p.m. The *Houssas* were already at Elmina. At about 1 a.m., 14th, the *Barracouta* and *Decoy* steamed for Elmina Roads, and about 3 a.m., the disembarkation of the troops commenced.—Owing, however, to the state of the tide and the heavy surf, the last of the Royal Marines were not landed till 5 a.m. About half past 4 a.m., the advance guards of *Houssas* had marched off, and the main body moved at a few minutes past 5.—About a quarter past 7 o'clock, after a march along a track, which at times led us through a swamp, knee deep, and at times through high bush, we encountered the enemy in a dense bush at a short distance from the village of Essaman, and after a short action drove him in, employing shells and rockets to dislodge him from the village, which fell into our hands at ten minutes to eight a.m. I caused the village to be destroyed. A large quantity of powder was found, together with many guns and some Ashantee war drums, indicating the presence of Ashantee war chiefs, and proving that our attack was a surprise. A few dead bodies were found but the nature of the bush renders all estimate either of the enemy's numbers or losses so conjectural that I prefer to make no attempt to define them. Our own losses were small, but I deeply regret that our list of wounded includes my chief staff officer, Colonel McNeill, V. C., C. M. G., whose temporary absence from the duties for which he is so efficient is a serious loss to the service at this time; and also Capt. Fremantle, R. N., the senior naval officer on the station, who was shot through the arm while superintending the artillery.—After a short halt we again marched at a quarter to ten, and arrived at Amquana at twenty minutes past twelve. This village was deserted, and I caused it to be destroyed. We were halted on the beach, and about two o'clock, after I had despatched the wounded with an escort of native troops to Elmina, left the greater part of the Royal Marines whom was anxious to spare undue fatigue, halted at Amquana, where they kept up my communications with Elmina, and moved with the remainder of the native troops and a few volunteers from the Royal Marines under command of Capt. Crease westward along the beach. After being joined by all the available marines and blue jackets who could be landed from Her Majesty's ships *Argus* and *Decoy*, we proceeded to Akimoo, found this village deserted and destroyed it. We then continued the march to Ampenee. This village was also deserted, and we destroyed it. The two last named villages had been shelled by