

noon of the 27th, and the collision took place on the evening of the 29th. There was no cause shown for so long a delay as this in the transit, no storm occurred, and no evidence was given that the Woburn Abbey could not have gone into dock. Therefore, here was a delay for a purpose other than one connected with the immediate transit from sea to dock. The very latest case of all, that of *The Princeton*, (38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 261), shows circumstances as regards the delay almost similar to those which happened in the case of the Woburn Abbey, and as in that case so in this, the vessel was inward bound. But here the delay occurred from a *vis major*, for the weather was so tempestuous that, after the first mooring, the vessel could not proceed with safety into dock. Consequently the court held that the pilot was not, as in the Woburn Abbey, *functus officio*, and that the delay was due to causes over which those who had charge of the vessel had no control. Therefore, it is obvious, as expressed in the proposition already given, that the Princeton was not voluntarily stationary for a purpose unconnected with and necessary for the actual transit. During the first part of the period during which the ship was moored she was stationary for purposes connected with her entry into dock, during the latter part on account of the stormy state of the weather. It is true that both these cases turned, to some extent, on certain acts of Parliament; but they do not affect the principle—they are connected more with the actual engagement of a pilot. Thus it seems clear that we are now, by an analysis of the facts of the four cases touched upon, enabled to extract a safe principle in regard to vessels proceeding from or to sea—a principle alike sensible and just, and one which a careful examination of the cases which we have cited as examples should make perfectly plain.—The London Law Times.

GENERAL NOTES.

PROFESSIONAL ETIQUETTE IN THE UNITED STATES. —We are afraid our excellent contemporary, the *Chicago Legal News*, has, "put its foot in it." The *Solicitors' Journal* having innocently said something about its being difficult for the "popular mind to grasp the idea of the majesty of the law as personified, for instance, in the American

courts, which, according to the description of a recent writer, consists of 'an elderly gentleman sitting on a cane bottom chair and expectorating thoughtfully,' the *Legal News* read "our learned and respected contemporary" a lecture, and informs it among other things that, "There is no country in the world where the judges of inferior courts of record preside with more dignity and indulge less in wrangles with attorneys, and are more respected by the bar and people, than in America." This is all well enough, if it be true, and it ought to be; but we doubt if it will have its due weight on the mind of "our learned and respected contemporary," for in the very next article in the *Legal News*, we are given an account of "professional etiquette on the frontier," wherein is stated the cause of the great unpopularity of Judge Beck, "Judge of Wyoming." We quote:

"He even carried his whim of professional propriety so far as to prohibit swearing in court, and is said to have fined a lawyer who swore at a witness during his cross-examination. Another peculiarity of this judge is a dislike of seeing attorneys, when arguing a case before him, pass around a bottle of whisky, and he is said to be violently opposed to lawyers treating the jury to "drinks" while a trial is in progress. Judge Beck is said to have violated common decency by refusing to proceed with a case until the attorneys engaged in it should put out their pipes; and a community once rose in indignation when he ordered a lawyer to remove his feet from the judge's desk."

This was all, no doubt, very difficult for the "popular mind" to submit to, but when Judge Beck instructed the grand jury "to indict every man who indulged in gambling, or sold liquor without a licence, the outraged public demanded his removal." As is usual under like circumstances in this country, the Legislature was "seen," and the result was that a "redistricting act" was passed, and Judge Beck was assigned to a district without "a town or a court house, and entirely uninhabited, except by military garrisons, Indians and wild beasts." The "popular mind" was thereby satisfied. Of course, Judge Beck was not a "politician"—a "machine politician"—or he never would have so run counter to the "sense of the people"—and this suggests the wonder, how, not being a "politician," he got his appointment—but however that may be, the *Legal News* should have remembered that the degenerate foreigner is not up in these matters, and should have kept its lecture and Judge Beck's case apart. BY