

to the learners, and, second, that he will present it so as to fit it as closely as possible to their past experience, in order that they may feel genuine appreciation of it. Interest as an aim, then, signifies caution and earnestness on the part of the teacher instead of carelessness and insincerity; it demands that he be a skilled instructor and not alone a pleasant person.

I have now stated, in brief, the Herbartian standpoint in regard to interest, with the commonly given reasons for the same. It is opposed to some quite prevalent views; consequently, there are several objections worthy of careful consideration. Those presented will be found to include one another to some extent, but, since they often appear in the exact form given, they will be treated independently.

First, might not work be made too easy if people became really interested in all of their tasks? Interest would make it easy in a certain sense, but never too easy, for work cannot be made too easy. Work is simply energy directed toward an end. If the expenditure of such energy is unpleasant, the work is called drudgery; if pleasant, it may become play. The difference, then, between work and play is entirely subjective. It does not destroy the value of a piece of work because one loves it; on the contrary, it is then likely to be done better and more quickly; it is said, certainly with truth, that no one ever made marked progress in a study that he detested, or rose high in a profession that he never enjoyed. Deep interest, then, leads to greater happiness as well as to a greater quantity and better quality of work. There is abundant reason, therefore, for converting as much drudgery into play as possible.

But, it may be asked, what pro-

vision is made for the development of the sense of duty, when we plan to make children interested in all the things that it is their duty to do? This question is put with the presupposition that interest and duty are opposed to each other. But is that the case? One's duty is the course of conduct that he is morally bound to follow. His sense of duty is the degree of appreciation that he feels for that course. If it appeals to him strongly, so that he feels under great obligations to pursue it, he is said to have a high sense of duty, or even a love for it. Love and duty are often opposed to each other; that is, we often love the course that should not be pursued and hate the plain path that ought to be followed. But the two are not necessarily opposed. Unless we believe in total depravity, some of our desires are good, and, just as there may be a strong hatred of duty, so there may be the opposite strong feeling of love for it. So sense of duty and interest, or love are not mutually exclusive; we can be interested in, and even love, our duty. This is plainly true if, in place of the abstract term *duty*, we take an individual instance of it. Everyone should love his country. Many respond to that duty with genuine pleasure; i. e., duty and love are there in full harmony.

The fault with people is that such harmony is often lacking; they have too often developed an interest in and love for wrong things. It is the province of the school to correct this evil, by beginning early to develop interest in right lines, in high ideals. In so doing, it is favoring the development of a sense of duty. Interest leads to desire, and the desire to follow the path of duty, simply has its origin in an interest of a high order.

As said at the beginning of this paper, if the will were transcendental in the extreme sense—i. e., if it were