

authors to facilitate predictions about the long-term consequences of systemic crises, to anticipate the likely consequences of future crises and to act in accord with the interests of world order. It has been the conclusion of previous researchers working with major data analysis exercises in the behavioral fashion that such prediction as may be attempted is of interest only to technocrats in the vast war bureaucracies of the superpowers and their allies, and is of little use to policy makers. Few who are concerned about world order will be convinced by the analysis which conceptualizes order in the international system as (in)stability of the volume of interactions within or without "normal fluctuation range," and (dis)equilibrium as the quality or significance of changes in numbers of essential actors or the distribution of power beyond reversible parameters.

The stakes involved in the issues with which this book deals — crisis, war, change, and world order — overwhelm the contributions which this book makes to the literature.

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Pages of lists

by Donald Barry

A Bibliography of Works on Canadian Foreign Relations, 1981-1985 compiled by Jane R. Barrett, with Jane Beaumont and Lee-Anne Broadhead. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1987, 157 pages, \$20.00.

This is the fourth in a continuing series of bibliographies on Canada's postwar external relations, published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. The three earlier volumes included works which appeared during 1945-70, 1971-75 and 1976-80. Like its predecessors, the current bibliography is certain to become an indispensable research tool for students of Canadian foreign policy.

The editors have done an impressive job. The selection is comprehensive; the entries are arranged under easily accessible subject and author

headings. There are a few curious omissions. "International Canada," the bimonthly summary of developments in Canadian foreign policy, which appears as a regular supplement to *International Perspectives*, is not mentioned. In addition, authors and titles of chapters in edited books on Canadian external relations are only intermittently identified. Nevertheless, this is a volume that can be profitably consulted by anyone who has a serious interest in Canada's foreign policy.

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A war biography

by Courtney Gilliat

Air Force spoken here: Ira C. Eaker & the Command of the Air by James Parton. Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler, 1986, 557 pages, US\$24.95.

Any airman, scholar or layman with an interest in the growth and development of air power will find this an absorbing book. It is more than a biography of General Ira C. Eaker, it is a history of the development of military aviation and of air power in the United States from the end of World War I to the end of World War II.

Eaker enlisted as an infantryman directly from college on the day in 1917 that the US declared war on Germany and later became a pilot in the US Air Corps and a Regular Army officer. His first post was to Rockwell in California where he met "Hap" Arnold, the Base Commander and Tooy Spaatz, his executive officer. Both men were to have a major impact on Eaker's career and they became lifelong friends and role models for Eaker.

Eaker was fortunate in his assignments. He saw at first hand, especially from 1935-1939, the struggle between the advocates of air power and the General Staff. The Army and Navy jealously guarded their resources for their own priorities. As a result, the Air Corps was starved for funds. In 1939 there were only 19 B-17s available; the funds for an order of 108

aircraft had been cancelled earlier.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, Eaker was in California with a fighter group and was immediately placed in charge of fighter defences for the whole Pacific Coast. In January 1942 General Arnold summoned him to Washington where he was given the task of creating the VIII Bomber Command in the United Kingdom. Eaker had a tremendous task requiring great diplomatic and negotiating skills, as well as those qualities required of an operational commander. He faced two difficult problems. First to convince the British of the validity of the concept of precision daylight bombing versus the night area bombing of the RAF, and second, to ensure a buildup of his strategic force to an effective strength. It was not until the Casablanca conference in January 1943 that he obtained the complete backing of both the RAF senior staff and of Churchill for the American strategic bombing plans.

Aircraft losses were high but not prohibitive in deep attacks against German targets. On the two Schweinfurt raids the losses were 15 percent and 19 percent with just over 300 aircraft per raid. Once the P51 Mustang was in service it was possible to escort bombers all the way to Berlin and back which greatly reduced aircraft losses. In early 1944 Eaker became Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Allied air forces. There he organized the shuttle raids to Russia, bombing German, Romanian and Hungarian targets en route.

Eaker had great qualities as an operational commander and leader of men. He was also a skilled diplomat, as was shown in his ability to quickly gain the trust and confidence of the RAF senior staff and of the British government leaders. He had great inherent executive talent in creating a viable strategic air force in a very short period of time. One does not read or hear much about General Eaker, perhaps because he was not a Montgomery or a Patton, but his contribution to the cause of air power and to the winning of World War II was second to none.

Courtney Gilliat is a retired Canadian military officer living in Ottawa.