

rating with South Africa; and another that, *inter alia*, linked Israel with the "racist minority regimes in Southern Africa". Canada abstained on a general resolution concerning self-determination that, among other things, strongly condemned those responsible for denying the Palestinian people their "inalienable national rights".

On the whole, Canada's 1977 Middle East policy at the UN was largely consistent with the pattern established in recent years. Canada's basic policy is rooted in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, whose essential elements call for peace, Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized borders, and a solution to the refugee problem. Since 1974, Canada's policy on the Palestinian refugees has evolved to an endorsement of a solution entailing their "political self-expression - consistent with the principle of self-determination" upon a "territorial foundation". (No Canadian official, however, has ever indicated that 242's reference to the "refugee problem" meant, as the drafters intended in 1967, to encompass Jewish as well as Arab refugees.) Voting positions taken by Canada over the years have tended to flow from Canada's appreciation of this resolution. It is quite common, therefore, to hear Canadian diplomats explaining votes on Middle East resolutions in the light of a resolution's compatibility, or inconsistency, with 242.

Keeping company

Canada's voting record in 1977 was most similar to the common performance of the nine European Community states. In fact, since 1973 Canada has tended to give substantial weight to the positions taken by the European Community when deciding how to vote on Middle East questions. The purpose of this policy appears to be the maximization of voting "company", or the avoidance of positions that leave Canada in conspicuous minorities along with Israel and the United States. This policy has at times entailed the apparent compromise of Canadian support for Resolution 242 and other policy principles.

The existence of a policy giving consideration to "company", which has never been officially confirmed, does not come as a surprise. Almost all members of the United Nations General Assembly are also members of political and/or regional sub-groups that attempt to employ bloc-voting strength whenever possible. Canada, for example, is a member of the "West European and Other" group, which includes 20 states. Other such blocs at the UN include the developing nations' "Group of 77" (with over 100 members) and the Arab bloc, which is not a

formally-recognized group at the UN but has at its base the 21 members of the Arab League. Israel, on the other hand, is one of the few "pariahs" at the UN that are excluded from all regional groups.

A statistical analysis of Canada's voting "company" on Middle East resolutions over the past 11 years has yielded a number of revealing facts. During the years 1967 to 1972, Canada's votes on Middle East issues coincided with U.S. positions 81 per cent of the time and with the European Community 44 per cent of the time. Since 1973, however, Canada's votes have matched American positions 38 per cent of the time and European Community positions 89 per cent of the time. The dramatic switch in the company Canada has kept has been matched by a clearly-discernible erosion of Canadian support for Israeli positions, as represented by "average votes" between the two periods. In the earlier period, Canada's "average vote" was between a no and an abstention on 16 anti-Israel resolutions; since 1973, on 46 resolutions Canada's "average vote" has moved much closer to an abstention. In contrast, both the Europeans and the Americans have moved in the opposite direction since the Assembly of 1973, manifesting relatively greater support for Israel, as represented by their "average votes", than in the 1967-72 period.

The findings of a parallel examination of Canada's voting record are consistent with this broad statistical perspective. An analysis of Canada's "explanations of vote", which attend almost every vote taken by Canada in international forums, indicates that 1973 represented a turning-point in Canadian policy on the Middle East. In comparison with the former era, Canada's support for Resolution 242 has been less firm and the consistency with which Canada applied official policy principles has been less manifest during the latter era. For example, Canada often opposed resolutions in the earlier period because they did not endorse the balance of principles embodied in Resolution 242; since 1973, Canada has supported a number of resolutions greatly at variance with Resolution 242. (In fact, since 1973 the Assembly has not reaffirmed Resolution 242 even once!)

These concomitant movements towards neutral and European Community positions on Middle East votes were again seen in 1977. Canada and the Europeans voted similarly on 14 of the 16 resolutions discussed above; Canada and the United States, on the other hand, agreed on nine of the 16. Canada's record of votes was four yes, six no and six abstentions. The common European Community record was five yes, five no and six abstentions. The United

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