

of the state; the latter are the duties arising from the various minor relations of men to one another, as in family, profession, employment. The *end* of duties in common is the good of the nation; the *ends* to be attained by respective duties, are the good of the family, the profession or the individual, as the case may be, but the lower ends are to be subordinated to the chief end.

After indicating the various divisions and kinds of good, Bacon then treats of the *cultivation of the mind*, as the necessary condition for attaining the end desired. This he divides into three parts,—the “doctrine of men’s natures and dispositions”; the “inquiry into the affections”; and the “doctrine of remedies”. The discussion of the two first classes is an attempt at a psychological basis of practical Ethics. We must carefully observe and study human nature in general, and also the peculiarities of individual character and circumstances, if we would be successful in the education of men in virtue. But not only must the physician know the patient’s constitution; he must also know the disease, if he would administer proper remedies. The *affections* are the “infirmities of the mind”. “The mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation”.<sup>1)</sup> The affections of pleasure and pain are the general affections; the affections of anger and tenderness, fear and hope, are examples of particular affections. In order to incite to right action, affection must be set against affection, that the stronger may overcome the weaker. Thus the state must use the affections of fear and hope “for the suppressing and bridling of the rest”. Fear of punishment overcomes the love of wrong-doing; hope of reward overbalances the desire for present gratification.<sup>2)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> Adv. of learn. Bk. II. p. 63.

<sup>2)</sup> We are here strikingly reminded of Descartes’ treatment of the passions, in his “*Traité des passions de l’âme*”; also of Spinoza’s proposition,—“A passion can only be restrained or removed by a passion opposite to and stronger than itself”. Sp. Eth. Bk. IV. prop. 7; Bk. III. prop. 43 &c.