

ante-facto, the use of "any and all means" to eliminate its capacity to do harm), and is incapable of responding to the disincentive program. Post-Gulf War Iraq is one such example.

Where nuclear states have not flagrantly violated international law – for example, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Israel – disincentives have never been seriously applied. In all such cases, carrots have proven more useful than sticks – and it is debatable, despite a decade's concentrated effort by the international community, whether sticks have succeeded in depriving Saddam Hussein of his nuclear weapons capability. The use of "stern" disincentives in the Asian subcontinent would, in the absence of flagrant violations of international norms (such as an overt act of war or nuclear terrorism), seriously undermine the prospects not only for denuclearization but also for regional (if not global) peace and stability, while the use of "mild" disincentives (such as heavy sanctions) would serve little purpose other than to reinforce already widespread perceptions of First-world interference in regional affairs.

ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

In addition to the internal and external initiatives outlined above, there are a number of options along the arms control continuum that may be pursued by external actors with reasonable expectation of success. Each has a number of caveats, however, many of which may prove to be "show-stoppers" unless significant progress is made, or incentives are offered, in some of the areas outlined above.

The first of these is a return to *ambiguous deterrence*, that is a policy of refusing to confirm or deny whether one possesses a nuclear arsenal. It is questionable how ambiguous deterrence can be once both states have demonstrated a viable nuclear weapons capability; however, if both India and Pakistan can be persuaded to agree not to further develop or construct warheads capable of being transported atop ballistic missiles, to cease the production of weapons-grade fissile material, and to deploy ballistic missiles in exclusively conventional roles, then at least a degree of ambiguity may be preserved. This option demands a degree of roll-back, but stops short of denuclearization. The drawback of this option is the importance of third-party monitoring and enforcement, in the face of considerable unwillingness by both India and Pakistan to allow external verification agencies into their nuclear design and test facilities.

A second attempt, which might credibly be pursued in conjunction with "ambiguous deterrence", would be to broker a condition of *non-weaponized deterrence* between New Delhi and Islamabad. This option varies in degree rather than in kind from the first, and would involve both India and Pakistan agreeing not to arm either combat aircraft or ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons; rather, such weapons would be kept, disassembled, under lock and key at well-known storage sites. While less stabilizing than the previous option, such an agreement would increase the decision-making time available in a crisis, and draw well-defined "lines in the sand." Surveillance assistance from the international community would enable both New Delhi and Islamabad to monitor activity at weapons storage sites, and provide early warning of a decision by either side to escalate