

ideologically sanctified at the highest level as part of “Deng Xiaoping Theory” as it constitutes “the continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought”. Referring to these same principles, Jiang Zeming clarified the Party-State thinking on China’s security at the key 15th National Party Congress, which set the CCP’s policy course after the death of Deng Xiaoping:

“...we should determine our position and policies by proceeding from the fundamental interests of the people of China and other countries and judging each case on its own merits. We shall not yield to any outside pressure or enter into alliance with any big power or group of countries, nor shall we establish any military bloc, join in the arms race or seek military expansion.”⁶

This reflected a deliberate mix of old and new principles. Chinese party leaders are arguably predisposed to building consensus on the basis of established wisdom even while claiming to adapt pragmatically to changing reality. Doctrinal revision in China, in other words, almost always takes place on a deliberate political basis of apparently principled evolutionary synthesis that incorporates new ideas without the wholesale rejection of past ideas.

The 1995 white paper highlighted China’s participation in the NPT since 1992 and reiterated support for the three goals of NPT, namely, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, accelerating nuclear disarmament and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. China’s support for transparent multilateral arms control measures and its opposition to arms races was again correlated with the need for a peaceful environment in order to focus on modernization.⁷ The 1995 white paper reiterated China’s official statement of 5 April 1995 that treated the no-first use pledge as a “negative security assurance” to all non-nuclear-weapon states, while undertaking “positive security assurance” based on all states need of sovereign self-defence. The 1995 paper also updated China’s UN statements since 1984 to the effect

⁶ Jiang Zemin, “Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory...”, September 12, 1997 in *Beijing Review*, no. 40, 6-12 October 1997, p. 29.

⁷ See “White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament”, *Xinhua*, 16 November 1995, op. cit, pp. 25-6.