

12. See: David Barton, Sigrid Pöllinger, and Ulf Reinius, "Negotiations for Conventional Force Reductions and Security in Europe", in *World Armaments and Disarmament: 1983*, SIPRI (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1983), pp. 595-608; Reinhard Mutz, "MBFR: Problems and Lessons", in *Quantitative Assessment in Arms Control*, ed. R. Avenhaus and R. Huber (New York: Plenum, 1984), pp.93-128; and Michael Sheehan, "A More Inane Congress: Twelve Years of MBFR", *Arms Control*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 1985), pp. 150-159.

13. See: Brian S. Mandell, "The Sinai Model: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification", in *Back to the Future: Lessons from Experience for Regional Arms Control and Verification*, ed. Brian S. Mandell (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1989), pp.51-80; *Idem.*, *The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management*, Arms Control Verification Study No. 3 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1987); and Sergey Koulik, "The Sinai Experience", in *Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe*, ed. R. Kokoski and S. Koulik (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1990), pp. 217-228.

14. See: *Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (Vienna: 1990).

15. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 112-142.

16. Terms were taken from *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 1990).

17. See: *Soviet Military Power 1990* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1990), p. 75.

18. See: *The Military Balance 1989-1990* (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 240-246.

19. *Vienna Document*, paragraphs 14-16.

20. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution RES/40/91/B of 12 December 1985.