

Angola itself, with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels still strong and receiving outside support, principally from South Africa and the United States, and the Angolan government too drained by war to provide even essential services to its battered and decimated population.

The situation in Mozambique is even worse, where unremitting warfare between the government and RENAMO rebels has now uprooted a large share of the total population, shattered the country's capacity even to feed itself, cost some half million lives, 90% of them civilians, and maimed and injured countless numbers. Even after the Nkomati accord was signed with South Africa in 1984, this hemorrhaging war continued as proof that Pretoria was unwilling or unable to control powerful groups in the country in their support of this most systematic example of destabilization. More recently, even growing American and British sympathy and support for Mozambique, and more restrained South African policies at home and in Namibia/Angola have not led to any marked reduction in the ruinous war in Mozambique.

There, as elsewhere in the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) countries, the Canadian government has come to recognize that relief and development efforts are almost pointless when their effects are so vulnerable to obliteration by warfare. While still not going as far as Britain, which is providing military training, or Zimbabwe, which provides direct and substantial military support, Canada is now providing "non-lethal" assistance to help provide security for transportation routes and other facilities in Mozambique.

Even though there may now be some legitimate question as to how much and how quickly the South African authorities could restrain RENAMO, there is no doubt that a stabilization of the South African internal situation with a firm and satisfactory commitment to the ending of *apartheid* will result in a diminution of all the remaining conflicts in the region. The new leadership in Pretoria, and the majority of white South African opinion, is still very far from accepting a fully non-racial democratic future for the country, but 1989 has seen progress that even the most hardened skeptics now concede to be dramatic.

Apart from the *de facto* relaxation of some of the most repressive measures by the regime – it should be noted that the state of emergency, press censorship, "banning" etc. remain formally in place – perhaps the most impressive development has been the statesmanlike