

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

No other method of international verification except inspection on grounds of suspicion in such a case will help to establish the truth. We should also reflect on how to take account, for our purposes, in the drawing up of measures for verifying the destruction of stocks, of the fact that any specialized facility of such a kind must have its own strict and clear technological regulations, specific parameters for the entry of chemicals and output of the products of their destruction, its own extensive range of devices for process management and control, and so forth.

In short, while appealing for a greater objectivity in the work on the provisions of the future convention relating to verification, we are gratified to note that some delegations are beginning to seek more realistic approaches. To mention just one example, the document on verification submitted by the delegation of Canada (CD/167) contains a whole series of interesting points, one of which says in effect that in the drawing up of various control measures the starting point should be minimum levels of intrusiveness in the internal affairs of States. It is to be hoped that in the positions of all delegations a spirit of realism and constructiveness will in the last resort prevail.

Mr. Chairman, in connection with the submission of the Soviet draft basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a number of delegations have requested us to answer some questions. We consider this an expression of interest in the Soviet document and express our gratification and thanks to those delegations for that interest. We have repeatedly explained our position on key questions of the convention, including, we hope, at today's meeting.

The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, in its document of 26 July, referred to our working paper CCD/539 of 3 August 1977, which stated that the main purpose of monitoring the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons should be to establish: (a) the fact of the destruction of an agent of a certain type; (b) the quantity of the agent destroyed; and (c) the quality of this agent. The delegation asked us: are the systematic international on-site inspections designed to achieve these goals?

We answer this question in the affirmative. It should be explained that in our 1977 document the principle of national verification is taken as the basis, but we see no reason for opposing national verification to international verification. We are in favour of a harmonious combination of the two types of verification.

We have also been asked, and not only by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, to explain what is meant by an "agreed quota". In the "Basic provisions of a convention", the carrying out of international on-site inspections at specialized facilities (of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes) on the basis of an agreed quota is proposed as one -- I repeat, one -- of the possible forms of such inspections. This does not mean that we are not prepared to consider other possible forms too. Obviously when agreement has been reached on procedures which are acceptable to all, we shall then have to work out in detail together the contents of such procedures. On a number of other specific issues the Soviet delegation intends to give a reply in the Working Group during the consideration of the relevant provisions of the future convention. I will say, however, at once, that in our opinion many questions call for joint answers, especially when they concern such matters as systematic international on-site inspections, on which in the past many different proposals have already been put forward by quite a large number of States.