

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

not only is it necessary to arrange adequate verification measures in a CTB treaty but we are convinced that adequate verification is also possible. As far as there are technical problems, we are confident that they can be overcome, inter alia, by drawing on the experience gained and to be gained in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, in which the Netherlands participates. I may recall that significant progress has been made by this Group in the design of a global verification system. Effective continuation of these efforts, including a full scale test of the seismic system, is called for. The time is also ripe for working out the administrative elements for such a seismic system within a CTB treaty.

A corollary to a CTB treaty would be a so-called "cut-off" agreement which would ban the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. This, too, would be an effective step in curbing the nuclear arms race. We are not unaware of the verification problems involved, but a cut-off presents one of the few effective nuclear arms control measures for which in principle an international verification system has already been worked out, to wit: nuclear safeguards. It seems logical, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should deal with this matter as well.

It stands to reason that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be re-established. The Netherlands delegation is one of those who hold that under the inspiring chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons came close to exhausting its mandate last year. We hope very much, therefore, that a new mandate can be agreed upon now, enabling the Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, as a matter of high priority, a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction.

Next to matters relating to the scope of a chemical weapons convention, the Ad Hoc Working Group will have to deal extensively with its verification provisions. We believe that verification should serve as one component in a system that, together with a meaningful scope and a reasonable amount of protective measures, will give a State more national security than the maintenance of the chemical weapon option would do. Without adequate verification, States will not be confident that the provisions of a convention will be observed. As we stated before, it is our considered view that within the framework of a chemical weapons convention, national and international verification are complementary. After all, we are dealing with a proven weapon system, ready and available in large amounts.

At the end of last year's summer session, at the 143rd meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, on 4 August 1981, I had the honour to introduce document CD/203 concerning consultative and co-operative verification measures and a complaints procedure in the framework of a chemical weapons convention. This document gives a complete outline of a reasonable, but effective, verification system and was designed in such a way as to take care especially of practical needs. Allow me briefly to recapitulate the main characteristics of our proposals:

Consultation, co-operation, verification and complaints are not treated individually but form elements of one integrated, consistent system;

National and international verification are therefore interlinked;

The establishment of national implementation agencies will be called for;