

Abstract

This study examines the application of a system of multimethod, interlocking verification procedures used for ensuring compliance with the Sinai I Agreement of 1974, the Sinai II Agreement of 1975, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. These methods included ground-based early warning systems, aerial and satellite reconnaissance, and on-site inspection undertaken by both third parties and the parties themselves. In addition to chronicling the process of Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of forces during the years 1973-82, the complex interrelationship between surveillance technology, peacekeeping and confidence-building is analyzed with a view toward identifying the prerequisites for the success of the Sinai model. A number of factors — political, military, geographic and technical — integrated in a unique manner were responsible for the success of the Sinai operation.

Guiding the case-study analysis are six propositions that seek to challenge some of the conventional wisdom regarding the prospects for regional arms control and verification:

- *Proposition 1*
Arms control and verification regimes can be created and sustained in regions plagued by endemic violence.
- *Proposition 2*
Third parties can facilitate the creation of arms control regimes as well as assist the parties in verifying new agreements.
- *Proposition 3*
Effective verification measures can contribute significantly to risk management and confidence-building in disputes where there is little or no history of conflict management.
- *Proposition 4*
Technology-intensive verification procedures can be integrated with more traditional

kinds of peacekeeping operations in order to strengthen the compliance process.

- *Proposition 5*
With appropriate modification, elements of the Sinai model can be applied to other regional conflict settings.
- *Proposition 6*
Third parties, including countries like Canada, can make a significant contribution to the verification of regional arms control agreements.

The analysis of the Sinai case-study confirms, in varying degrees, all the propositions noted above. Three principal findings of the study are, however, especially noteworthy. First, verification can contribute significantly to risk management and confidence-building, and thus provide the necessary impetus for more far-reaching arms control and verification arrangements. In the immediate aftermath of hostilities, when confidence is virtually non-existent, the verification system serves an important risk reduction function by dampening incentives for surprise attack, providing adequate early warning and clarifying ambiguous activities.

Once the verification system has withstood the initial "litmus test" of intentions, thereby strengthening the position of those in power who opted for a policy of disengagement rather than confrontation, then compliance with the verified agreement will build confidence over time to the point where defection from the agreement is seen as politically and strategically counter-productive. The Sinai case strongly suggests the extent to which confidence emanating from the successful verification of a military agreement preceded, and ultimately advanced, political accommodation between the parties such that the signing of a peace treaty was possible. Moreover, the synergistic integration of individual verification components (i.e., unattended ground sensors, on-site inspections and aerial reconnaissance) clearly illustrated that procedures which worked well in the past could facilitate both the negotiation and implementa-