

naval manoeuvres in the European "area" (airspace above and adjacent sea areas out to several hundred kilometers or more), the potential for reducing concern about "unknown" military activities and their pre-emptive possibilities seems substantial. In general, notification measures in combination with selected "constraint" measures could significantly reduce concerns about surprise attack.

5. **Notification of Military Movements and "Out-of-Garrison" Activities.** This type of CBM proposal, like many others, is best operationalized in combination with more intrusive inspection measures. The point of notifying military movements is virtually the same as that underlying the notification of manoeuvres – to clarify the purpose of military activities that could be construed as being preparations for attack. According to these proposed CBMs, movements or "out-of-garrison" activities would be notified in advance (again, times range from 21 up to 60 days) and the notification would contain information about the size, composition and movements of the military forces in question. Given the existing deployment realities in central Europe, the normal movement of military forces (for, for instance, rotation) into the sensitive inter-German border region is always a matter of concern. Relatively detailed prior notification (always in combination with the possibility of reliable verification) would reduce the anxiety-producing character of such necessary military activities for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. Some proposals suggest maximum sizes for movements. As is the case with size limits for allowable manoeuvres, these proposals are properly "constraint" CBMs, a more ambitious category of Confidence-Building proposal which should be kept separate (at least analytically) from the more feasible notification measures. They are dealt with later in the chapter.
6. **Mobilization Notification.** The obvious logical complement of other notification measures, these proposals require timely notification of mobilization exercises, including information on the time, num-

bers and general movements of troops involved. The obvious purpose is to help distinguish between necessary exercises and highly destabilizing actual mobilizations.

7. **Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Test Notifications.** This type of proposal is intended to reduce uncertainty about the test firing of strategic (or, presumably, shorter range) nuclear weapons. As is the case with many other notification CBMs, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness, these measures are best combined with more rigorous "constraint" CBMs. Nuclear weapon test notification measures call for advance notification of scheduled missile test firings, including those that are conducted as part of major military exercises. Such proposals might also include notification of the simulated use of nuclear weapons in a military exercise. It is not clear how much information should be contained in such notifications, but they could specify general launch and impact locations as well as time of launch(es). Measures similar to these are already practiced when test launches occur over the open seas but they frequently lack detail. Recent Soviet and American proposals have included advance notification of ICBM and SLBM test flights as well as multiple bomber take-offs.

The general category of notification measures offers modest but significant potential for building confidence in both the reliability of adversary states (through the accuracy of their reports) and their relatively benign intentions (if they are, in fact, benign). The idea of declaring what will soon be evident in any event is not terribly challenging and publication of modest amounts of information about the notified activities would rarely cause any security problem. In short, they offer the prospect of at least some degree of enhanced stability, predictability and confidence at little cost and minimal risk. Invariably, notification measures can be integrated with "constraint" measures – measures calling for the actual restriction of certain capabilities – to render both more effective.

