detailed modalities to govern such inspections, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 12 below.

Measure 3: Monitored Storage Sites and Monitored Low Strength Units

In addition to the provisions outlined in Measure 1, these sites and units will be subject to appropriate monitoring measures to be agreed.

Measure 4: Monitoring of Reductions

- (A) Destruction of treaty-limited equipment that is to be reduced shall be in accordance with procedures to be agreed by the participants. This destruction shall take place at designated sites and shall be completed according to an agreed timetable within a period of (x) years.
- (B) All destruction of equipment above agreed ceilings shall be notified in advance and be subject to on-site monitoring without quotas or right of refusal. Treaty-limited equipment shall be considered destroyed when agreed prior notification procedures have been followed, the destruction has been carried out in accordance with agreed procedures, and notification has been received that such destruction has been completed. Participants will agree on the notification, destruction and monitoring procedures to be followed.
- (C) Reduction of US and Soviet stationed personnel shall be completed according to an agreed timetable within a period of (x) months and the reductions shall be subject to monitoring by any of the participants.

Measure 5: Monitoring of Stabilizing Measures

Participants shall also have the right to monitor, under appropriate conditions, the call-up of reservists (Stabilizing Measure 1), movements from one location to another (as notified under the terms of Stabilizing Measure 2), and the size of military activities (Stabilizing Measure 5).

Measure 6: Aerial Inspection

A CFE regime will include provisions for aerial inspection. Modalities and quotas require further study. The parties shall consider cooperative measures to enhance aerial inspection.

Measure 7: Possible Special Measures for Verification of Aircraft and Helicopter Limits.

The possibility of additional measures to deal specifically with the verification of combat aircraft and combat helicopters, such as identification by number or perhaps tagging of aircraft and helicopters permanently land based in the area of application, requires further study.

Measure 8: National or Multinational Technical Means

- (A) No participant shall interfere with national or multinational technical means of verification, or use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the CFE treaty except cover and concealment practices associated with normal training, maintenance, and operations.
- (B) The participants shall consider cooperative measures to enhance national or multinational technical means of verification.

Measure 9: Joint Consultative Group

Participants will establish a Joint Consultative Group in the framework of which they will resolve ambiguities, address questions of compliance as well as promote the treaty's viability.

12. General Considerations

- (A) No state shall exercise inspection rights on the territory of other parties who belong to the same treaty of alliance. Each inspection or monitoring team shall be the responsibility of one state. That state may include representatives of other members of the treaty of alliance to which it belongs on its inspection or monitoring team if it chooses. In conducting on-site inspections, the inspecting party should be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey within the site that is being inspected except at sensitive areas or points.
- (B) Each participant shall be entitled to conduct an agreed number of inspections upon the territory of other participants in the area of application. These active quotas are to be determined among the members of the same alliance. Unusual quotas may be transfered to other members of the same alliance, however, no participant will be obliged to accept more than 10 percent of its passive quota of inspections in each calendar year from

the same participant. The number of inspections available for the participants in each alliance should be sufficient for effective verification.

(C) Other details of modalities for verification provisions and the specific rights and duties of inspecting and inspected states will be agreed and contained in an inspection protocol.

V. Non-circumvention

- 13. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to all other parties three months in advance of its withdrawal. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
- 14. Each party shall, in particular, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if a party were to increase its holdings in tanks, artillery pieces, armoured troop carriers, land-based combat aircraft or land-based combat helicopters, as defined in Chapter I, which are outside the scope of the limitations of the treaty, in such proportions as to pose a direct and obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application.

VI. Other Issues

- 15. Measures will also be required for the notification and monitoring, under appropriate circumstances to be worked out, of arrivals of main battle tanks, artillery pieces, armoured troop carriers, land-based combat aircraft and land-based combat helicopters in the area of application, exits being duly taken into account so as to provide necessary assurance that the agreed ceilings under Chapter I will not be exceeded or circumvented.
- 16. Measures will be required to provide necessary assurance that the agreed ceilings under Chapter I are not exceeded or circumvented through the disposition in the zone of newly produced main battle tanks, artillery, armoured troop carriers, land-based combat aircraft and land-based combat helicopters.