tion was at London. This was answered by a very full affidavit of the plaintiff's solicitor, who carefully complied with the provisions of Con. Rule 518. He said that the plaintiff and some one from his office would have to come from New York, and apparently one or two experts. But two experts resident in Toronto would also be called, and one on a question about a rubber blanket being considered a necessary part of the machine in question. He further said that the fact of the machine being in London was of no importance now, seeing that it had been in use for nearly two years. The shipping bill of the machine and rollers was dated the 10th June, 1910. This, he said, was confirmed by the fact that the defendants had made payments on account on seven different occasions since receiving the machine. The defendants, who were counterclaiming for damages for the alleged inefficiency of the machine, had served a jury notice. The Master said that, if this stood, there could not be a trial either at Toronto or at London until next September. Perhaps, on an application to strike out the jury notice, it might be thought right to do so, unless the defendants would accept the plaintiff's offer to have the case set down now and tried at the current jury sittings at Toronto. Another plan would be to strike out the jury notice and have the case tried at Toronto or at the London non-jury sittings at the end of April. However that might be, at present the Master did not think that any case was made out for the change of venue; and the motion was dismissed with costs in the cause. S. G. Crowell, for the defendants. O. H. King, for the plaintiff.

MEYER v. CLARKE—MASTER IN CHAMBERS—MARCH 19.

Discovery—Examination of Defendant—Libel—Questions as to Similar Statements — Privilege — Malice.] — Motion by the plaintiff for an order requiring the defendant to attend for re-examination for discovery and answer certain questions which he refused to answer upon his examination. The action was for libel. The defendant justified and also pleaded qualified privilege. Questions objected to were as to whether the defendant had written other similar letters or made similar statements respecting the plaintiff to other persons. These, the Master said, should be answered, as they tended to prove "malice in law," and displaced the ground of privilege. See Odgers on Libel and Slander, 8th Eng. ed., pp. 348, 390. The defendant should