

They were entirely civilians, untrained in military habits, and rushed into the field. It is true that in these past days medical war organization was in a chaotic unorganized condition; the army surgeon was in those days hardly if at all removed from the civil doctor, and had not become the specialist he is to-day.

By comparison with 1850 we are in 1885 a body of specialists as much removed from the average civil physician as the special oculist, or special aurist, or special medico-legal authority is removed from the average doctor.

We all belong, it is true, to the same profession, but we have since 1850 specialized our work in a very great degree. Our own internal corps' discipline once non-existent is rapidly developing, our power to achieve good war results has never been better, our grip of our work and how to achieve success in it is far greater than it ever was before; we at any rate know what we want.

But just as we progress in our speciality, just as we differentiate our work from average civil practice, by so much do we isolate ourselves from possibility of falling back on ordinary untrained civil medical aid in war time, and just in the same degree do we need to teach our new knowledge to others so that it may be no longer a specialism.

Bearing in mind this governing idea, how are we to achieve our end. Simply by carrying the teaching of our specialism into the medical schools of the country. We desire not to shut up in our own narrow corps' circle the special knowledge we have attained of war work, gathered at such great suffering to ourselves, but rather to carry it into the medical schools and to diffuse it amongst our civil brothers, feeling that in the end it is entirely in the interest of both sections of the profession that it should be so.

The army is to-day going back rapidly to the nation. It is no longer a narrow class shut off by barriers from the people; it is the people itself. It is entirely our interest and entirely our duty so far as we are concerned as being a corps in the army to go back to the civil profession and population for sympathy, for aid, for real help in our important work.

We need then to foster by every means the idea now sown in the civil medical schools, that training in the discipline, the organization, the drill, the subordination of individuals to attain an end, the power of obeying orders, and the force of character to make oneself obeyed, needed in a military service should not be our exclusive possession. We need to utilize this volunteer idea and to ask these students of medicine in the name of England to learn as students and as juniors the work of the ambulance companies and the field hospitals. We must ask them to continue, as they are now doing, to practise as private volunteers, as corporals, as sergeants, and as under-officers the routine and the discipline of the regular medical corps. They are now doing this with much public spirit in many medical schools, and are devoting their spare time to learning this special work. It deserves the fostering care of the state. The ambulance *materiel*, the field hospital equipment, the capitation grant and the sympathetic aid of the State may well be extended to a work of actual national importance, viz., that the civil profession of medicine may be trained to be able in case of invasion to work with accuracy the ambulance aid of the volunteer force, and further, as we now suggest, to afford temporary war aid in our foreign national wars. The provision of trained instructors from the regular medical service, and the careful forwarding of specimens of all new ambulance developments to the schools for experiment may cost some money.

Can any one deny that it would be money well spent? I can safely say that no person has denied that it is entirely utilitarian in character and deserves well of the country.

Let us then agree that all sympathy and financial aid shall be given to such national work and that a medical cadet corps shall be fostered in our great medical schools, to practise all these war details until we shall have the civil profession leavened with some of our knowledge. It is from such students trained to discipline and to habits of command that we shall develop the young surgeons we need for this special war aid work and to officer our volunteer medical service.

*To be continued.*

66TH P.L.F.—The regiment has been served with a complete outfit of clothing, new tunics, pants and overcoats, and is to be furnished with the new valise, and new helmets are now ordered for the men. The band is one of the best in the city, and with the drum and fife corps is probably second to none in the Dominion. Altogether the prospects of the 66th Batt. are most encouraging.—*Halifax Evening Mail.*

FREDERICTON, N.B.—The whole Infantry School Corps marched out on the 23rd, shod in moccasins and snowshoes. They marched down the river and performed various evolutions in skirmishing, battalion drill, etc. Turning landward, they ascended the heights in the neighborhood of Salamanca, marched through the woods in single file, and came back to barracks by way of the Maryland road and Regent street.—*Capital.*

## CORRESPONDENCE.

### THE ACTIVE MILITIA AND THE SCHOOLS.

*To the Editor of the Canadian Militia Gazette:*

SIR,—As an officer of the active force I beg to enter my protest against the idea, which appears to be entertained in some quarters, that the artillery, cavalry and infantry schools are to be regarded as the "regular army of Canada," and that, in relation to them, the active force are merely "volunteers." For this idea there is no foundation in fact, and it is one which the officers of the active force should resist to the uttermost, unless they are prepared to allow themselves to be gradually supplanted by a regular force, the cost of which will year by year increase, until it absorbs entirely; as it has already partially done, the whole amount granted for militia expenditure. The schools, or, as it is becoming now the fashion to call them, the permanent corps, were established as auxiliaries to the active force, for the express purpose of providing a means of instruction for the officers of that force. On that basis, and that only, did Parliament vote the money for their establishment. No minister would have ventured to ask money for a permanent force—for a regular army—yet there are abundant indications that under color of these "schools" a permanent force is being set on foot, the strength of which will gradually increase, and for which larger grants will gradually be required. The expenditure on the active force remains the same, while the schools are having everything done for them that can be done to increase their efficiency as regular troops. The policy is, in short, to cut down the militia and add to the strength of the schools. Now, while I admit that the establishment of schools for the instruction of the officers and non-com. officers of the militia was a matter of necessity, and that these schools have been so managed as to be of great value for the purpose for which they were intended, I contend that the Government overstep their authority when they practically convert these schools of instruction into a force which, in as far as its strength will permit, is to take the place of the militia whenever any active operations are required. The policy now being pursued should be reversed. The active militia should be regarded and treated as being what it really is—Her Majesty's regular army in Canada. If its numerical strength is too great to be efficiently maintained let a reasonable and careful reduction be made consistent with the requirements and resources of the country, so that, within the limits of a reasonable expenditure, the whole force, and not merely a part of it, may be drilled regularly every year—that it may be properly equipped for active service—and that its officers may be sufficiently instructed for the performance of any duty which may be required of them. This requires no new system; it only demands the faithful carrying out of the present system—a system which gives the best results for the least money of any that could be devised—a system which is suited to the conditions of the country and to the feelings of the people, and a system which the people understand, and are willing to give effect to. I admit that there are weak points in it. So there are, and must be, in all systems, but many of these weak points would disappear if the system were thoroughly adopted. It never has had, and never can have, fair play under the present militia expenditure. Nor is any great additional expenditure required. An extra grant of \$300,000 would drill the whole of the present force for twelve days every year—would drill it for fifteen days every year if weak companies and battalions mostly existing on paper were struck out. But were the present expenditure doubled, for which there is no necessity, the expenditure per head of our population would be far below the military expenditure of the United States government—exclusive of the State militia—far below what would be the cost of the smallest possible regular force which this country would have to set on foot to take the place of the militia in even its present half starved condition. Last year the schools and batteries cost \$280,000, while the whole amount expended in the training of the militia was \$230,000. The cost of "C" Company, exclusive of clothing, was \$35,000, or \$350 per man, while the Queen's Own cost a little over \$4,300 or \$10 per man. Eight battalions of ten companies such as the Queen's Own or 30th, forming a force of 3,400, could be kept in a state of reasonable efficiency for the same cost as "C" Company with 100 men! From these figures your readers will understand the difference in cost between the militia as at present constituted and the permanent corps, the strength of which it is now proposed to increase from 100 to 150 men, avowedly as the nucleus of a regular force. They will understand also what the cost of a regular army, even of the smallest dimensions, would be. It is hardly necessary further to point out to the officers of the active force the secondary position in which they will be placed, not only as regards expenditure, but also as regards military standing, if the policy of establishing a regular force is further developed.

MILES.

### GENERAL ARTILLERY CAMP OF INSTRUCTION.

*To the Editor of the Canadian Militia Gazette:*

SIR,—Having been for some time a reader of your very interesting paper, I wish to make a few remarks and suggestions, regarding the advisability of having one general camp of instruction for the ten field batteries in the Province of Ontario. All the artillery officers of the permanent and active militia favor this idea, and two excellent places at once suggest themselves to me as being most suitable in every respect, viz., Kingston and Niagara, the former being more central and the latter having more room for manœuvres, both having good water and camping ground. The advantages of such a camp would be manifold. In their yearly reports the inspector and assistant inspectors complain that owing to the hurried nature of their inspections and the large extent of territory they have to traverse during the two weeks taken up by the annual drill they cannot thoroughly examine into the minute details in a battery or see the usual drills carried out. As it is now, the deputy-adjutants-general usually leave the artillery to themselves, they very rarely manœuvre with the other troops, the D.A.G. confining himself to the infantry, to which arm of the service he usually belongs, and he cares very little about the artillery, their drill or requirements.

A camp such as proposed would consist of three or four brigades: 1st brigade—London battery, 1st Provisional brigade; 2nd brigade—Hamilton, Toronto, Welland Canal batteries; 3rd brigade—Durham, Kingston, Ottawa, Gananoque batteries. The 3rd brigade could easily be divided into two. The twelve or fifteen days' drill could be carried on immediately under the supervision of the officer commanding the Canadian artillery, assisted by the assistant inspectors and the officers of the Royal School of Artillery, one of whom could act as brigade-major and the others as brigade adjutants, while the school non-coms. could act as brigade non-coms. and