likely to result, and not many are likely to take advantage of the privilege. We shall be delighted to welcome those of our legal "sistren" who may join us. They will, of course, understand that the story of the lady who had been attending a women's rights convention applies to them. This lady entered a car filled with men, and looked daggers because no one offered to rise and give her a seat. An old "hayseed," more plucky than the rest, asked, "Be you one of them women's rights women?" Upon receiving a decisive answer in the affirmative, he settled himself comfortably in his corner and observed encouragingly, "Well, then, stand up for your rights like a man!"

WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE.

An impression has extensively prevailed and that not among laymen only, that, since the last session of Parliament, persons charged with offences might be called as witnesses. An examination of the statutes then passed will show, of course, that this is not the case. The misapprehension arose, no doubt, from the fact that a bill to that effect was introduced by the Minister of Justice, but afterwards withdrawn—for the present, it was understood. So that we may expect to see a similar measure proposed next session; one which, we hope, will be unclogged with some of the conditions appearing in the last bill—conditions which, we thought, showed too anxious a desire for the protection of the criminal.

The subject is one that admits of an immense deal to be said on either side, and opens up a question almost as large as that of the abolition of the grand jury. Some of the most conservative of our legislators and judges would seal the mouth of every person charged with or suspected of an offence, and not permit it to be opened again till after the verdict at his trial. They are of the opinion that every such person is not of the same mental calibre as the prisoner (an Irishman, of course) who, upon being asked whether he was guilty or not, replied, "How can I tell, till I hear the evidence?" And here we cannot help recalling the many disputes and altercations we have been witness to in courts of criminal justice as to the admissibility as evidence of statements made by the prisoner, in the course of which very diverse views have been expressed by different judges.

Very old practitioners will remember when the law, as laid down in *Regina* v. *Drew*, prevailed, until disapproved of by the Court of Criminal Appeal. To us of the present day, it appears that the desire to prevent the accused committing himself must have been very strong, when his statements, made in the face of a warning not to say anything to prejudice himself, would not be admitted in evidence, even when there was no shadow of a pretence that any inducement was held out to make a statement. We can, however, without much trouble, lay our finger upon the recorded utterances of some of our judges here (some of them still on the Bench) against the impropriety of receiving in evidence against a prisoner any statement made to, say, a constable, even though that officer denied that anything in the shape of an inducement to make the statement had been held out by him.