applies equally to the Genules, and we find probibition with consunguinity. The fourth particularly, that its violation by the Gentiles is deprecated, which clearly shows that it is moral. We may call it the statute law o he iven in regard to marriage, and hence we account for the solemanty with which it, of kin. Whether they be cases of affility or is introduced in the opening verse of the chapter to waich I have referred. There is no middle course, as it appears to me, bet vixt that which I have stated, and the promiscuous intercourse that consutates one of the foulest dogmas of Socialism, and I feel impressed with the conviction, that the Lev. 18; 6. This phrase refers distinctly tendency of that which the bill we have met, to marriage, it is a universal law, expressed to oppose, goes to legalize, is to introduce in language of universality. Observe, too, into the upper classes, the same abomination which was lately attempted to be introduced unongst the lower classes—the duced unongst the lower classes—the And mark the solemnty of the announce-loathsome abominations of Socialism. The ment—"I am the Lord." This is what second general principle to which I would may be called the enacting classe of the beg attention, is, that the sexes are convertible. We mean by the, that what a man, folded. According to the language of momay do in respect of marriage, a woman, dern legislation it contains the great prinmay do; and what a man may not do, a ciple of the bill—the great principle, apwoman may not do. A man and wom in are placed on the same footing, and the incest. This marks out the footin general same prombition upplies to bota. The pro- principle. Now, taking these general principle. hibited degrees of marriage to a min in ciples along with us, let us look in the respect of woman, are the prohibited desperators and see whether we have any grees to a woman in respect of a man, proof that the marriage of a man with his This, I apprehend, none will only. It is, indeel, indispensable, if we admit that a man and a woman are equally moral beings. that a woman has a soul as well as a man, and is equally responsible to God. If that bidden to marry his own sister or half-is admitted, the convertibility of the sexes eister. "The nakedness of thy sister, the must be admitted also. The third general, principle which I am anxious to bring before you, is, that affin ty and consauguinity, as grounds of prohibition and perm ssion, are equivalent, to the husband his wife's relations are the sains as his own, in the same degree, and to the wife, her husband's relations are the same as her own, in the same degree. That is to say, to a husband, his wife's mother, sister, niece, are the same as his own; and to a wife, her husband's father, brosher, nephew, are the same as her own. The relations of each, in short, ars alike to both, in the same degree. Now, the principle on which these rest is the principle which hes at the foundation of the law of marriage. God said, "let a man a man leave his father and mother, and cleave unto his wife, and they two shall be affinity and they two shall be affinity and consunguinity are the same. If this principle is admitted, as we have enbetween the man and his wife. This idendeavored to show that it is in harmony with tity is at the very foundation of marriage. The importance of this, in regard to social morality must be apparent at once. The principle I have state I of allinity and consanguinity being equivalent, is admitted in the laws of our country, as might be shown by referring to Blackstone's Commentary, and other legal authorities. But it is more to my present purpose to remark, this principle of affinity and consanguinity being equivalent, pervades the whole of the 18th chapter of Leviticus. There are in this chapter sevent en instances of prohibited degrees. And it is not unworthy of notice, that of these seventeen degrees, eleven are degrees of affinity, and only six of consanguinity. We are upt to think that consangainity is a stronger ground of prohibition than affinity; but the majority of prohibi-tions has respect to cases of affinity, and this entitles us to draw the conclusion, that at least afficity is an equally valid ground of his brother's wife, and forbids a woman to

general principle is, that the prohibited degrees all sping out of one circumstance. they have all one root. What is that root or circumstance? It is proping if y or nearness consunguinity, the prohibition always rests on this one circumstance of nearness of kin. The foundation is laid for this in man and wife being " one flesh." None of you shall approach to any near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness;" "I am the Lord," that the prociple on which this prohibition rests, is bearness of kin, or propinquity. statute, which is afterwards more fully unplicable to what follows on the subject of principle. Now, taking these general prindeceased wife's sister, is contrary to the word of God.

Too first thing we remark by way of proof is, that a man is expressly fordaughter of thy father, or daughter of thy mother, whether she be burn at bome, or born abroad, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover." Lev. 18; 9. Now, here, elearly and distinctly, is marriage forbidden between a man and his own sister, the daughter of his mother, or even the halfsister, although she be daughter only of tha father, or mother, and not the daughter of both. Nothing can be clearer than this. Remember, then, the third general principle, that affinity and consanguinity are equivalent, and from this it will appear equally clear that a man is forbidden to marry his wife's sister; on the principle of consanguality, he is forbidden to marry his own sister ;, and on the principle of affinity reason, Scripture, and common law, then it is contrary to the Word of God, for a man to marry his wife's sister.

Again, a woman is forbidden to marry her busband's brother. Lev. 18; 16. Here, clearly, a woman is forbidden to marry her husband's brother, for it a man is forbidden to marry his brother's wife, of course the wife is forbidden to marry her husband's brother. Now, observe, that if a man may not marry his brother's wife, on the second general principle, (that the sexes are convertible), it follows that a woman is not to marry her sister's husband, which is done when a husband marries his wife's sister. But the former is strictly forbidden, and in the convertibility of the sexes, the latter must be forbilden also. It is clear and distinct, therefore, that on the principle of the convertibility of the sexes, this passage forbids a man to marry

marry her sister's husband. But there is a double inference from the passage, and you may take it thus; a wife's sis er in to the man what the husband's brother is to the woman, and if a woman may not marry her husband's brother, so neither may a man marry his wife's si-ter. There was no inference in the world that can be more legitimate than this. True, it existed under the form of dispensation, that there was a law authorizing a man to marry his brother's wife. We find in the book of Deuteronomy, 25 Cap. and 5th verse. "If brothen dwell together, and one of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger; her husband's brother shall go in unto her and take her to him to wife, and perform tho duty of a husband's brother to her." There may seem to be something a little inconsistent in this, but observe, this exception strengthens, instead of weakening the general rule. It does so, inasmuch as nothing else thin the original authority which made the first law, could dispense with it by making this exception one. That exceptional law was introduced for a special purpose, and being so, it left the law in force in every other case, and then still further, the special purpose for which this exception was made, having ceased to exist, the law now stands without any exception whatever. And if this will not satisfy our opponents, we beg their attention to this, that one exceptional laws, while in to ce, constituted not a permission, but an obligation to marry a deceased brother's wife, the widow was allowed to punish him, and to east on him contempt, if he refused to marry her; and if men will argue from this circumstance in connection with the subject before us, they will find that this argument will go further than they intended. It will oblige every man whose wife dies; leaving a marriageable sister, to mairy that sister; and this, we presume, will not always be found agreeable or convenient to parties.

Now, the third point to which I would refer, is one to which I attach great importance; I do not see how it is to be got over. It is this, that degrees of officity more remote than that of a wife's sister are directly prohibited. There are two in particular to which I would refer. The first is contained in the 14th verse of the 18th chapter of Lev. "Here a man is prohibited from marrying his aunt-in-law." Then, verse 17th of the same chapter. A daughter by a former marriage—this is a grand stepdaughter. Here are two cases prohibited, morriage with an aunt-in-law, and marriage with a grand step-daughter. Now, what is the principle on which they are prohibited? It is given in the conclusive of the 17th verse. "For they are his near kinswomen." It is the principle of propinquity. Very well, if marriage with such is prohibited on the principle of no irness of kin, surely marringes with an individual nearer still must be prohibited also. These individuals are in the coll-teral-relations of the second degree, whereas a wife's sister is in the col'ate al relation of the first degree. And if the former are not to be murried, does not every one see that neither can the lutter be taken into the relation of marriage? The conclusion in this case is not less logitimate or conclusive from the premises, than either of the former. Now we have three arguments,