

is the moral character of it. The valuation comes in the form of sense or feeling, and makes itself distinct in the consciousness in the moment of cognition. The eye of an animal may take in all the elements of a landscape, or of an outward act, that the eye of a man can take; but the reason why moral and aesthetic distinctions are perceived in the one case and not in the other is, that man alone is endowed with the subjective senses or feelings that make a moral and aesthetic discrimination. In the mind of man there arises subjectively in the moment of perception or knowledge, a sense (as the case may be) either condemnatory or of beauty, the objective act or thing being swathed in the subjective sense, as perceived together; and we say that we feel that such a thing is wrong, or (as the case may be) that it is beautiful; because to feel a sense is but another way of saying that we perceive a sense. The outward act or thing looked at in its own bare physical elements, presents nothing either moral or aesthetic. It is only when the mind looks at it in the light of its own subjective moral or aesthetic powers, that the moral or aesthetic value of the thing is perceived.

Synoptical Sketch of the Subjective Senses or Feelings.

1. A popular method of dividing man's rational nature is to distinguish his cognitive or perceptive nature as the "Head," and his moral or emotional nature as the "Heart" and "Will."

2. The subjective senses or feelings are divisible into two great classes. (1) The subjective senses or sensations arising from a physical source, which are produced in the perceptive mind, in virtue of its connection with the nervous organization, as pain, hunger, thirst, etc. (2) Those subjective senses or feelings which arise in the perceptive mind from its own essential character, independent of mere physical causes.

The first great class, which was referred to in an early part of this work, and there called Subjective Physical Sensations or Senses, to distinguish them from objective physical sensations, may be divided into two kinds: (1) those arising in connection with the five senses, as the pain of heat, cold, etc.; and (2) those of appetite—hunger, thirst, sexual connection, etc.

The second great class of subjective senses, or feelings, also distinguished as moral, are divisible into five classes: (1) Those of Taste, or the aesthetic—as beauty, harmony, etc.; those of the "Heart," or "disposition"—those emotional propensities or affections which stimulate or seek gratification, attract or repel us, in all our social or moral relations—as love, hatred, grief, sorrow, etc. (observe that the word "Heart" has also a wide meaning in the following Table); (3) those of the Conscience, or of Rectoral Obligation, which seek pacification—as, for instance, a sense of condemnation or acquittal, of approbation or disapproval; (4) those of the Will—as, consent, indecision, etc.; (5) those also of Cognition or Knowledge—as, doubt or assurance.

POPULAR DISTINCTION.		HEART.		WILL.		HEAD.	
Animal.		Emotional.		Volitional.		Cognitive.	
Subjective feelings from a physical source.		Subjective feelings, moral, or from a mental or internal source.				Divisible into.	
1	2	1	2	3	4	5	
Sense feelings.	Appetite feelings.	Taste aesthetic feelings.	Heart propensities or affections.	Conscience or of rectoral obligation.	Will of consent, indecision, etc., etc.	Assurance or doubt.	Conception.

NOTE.—Subjective energy, the other element of will, is omitted from the above Table for convenience.

Though all subjective senses or feelings agree in being states of the mind, they differ considerably in their nature. Those arising from a physical source, we have in common with the brutes. Those of the will and intellect, partake of little or no emotion, have no pain or pleasure, desire or aversion.

Those of Conscience differ from the other emotive feelings in the nature of their promptings: thus, instead of strong desire or aversion, they have a strong sense of "oughtness," of positive or negative obligation. They are in all respects as real as those of desire or aversion, but their function is to point out our duty—not what we would like or dislike. They are the true rectoral part of our nature, and alone ought to be our moral guide. The subjective senses of the heart are attended with most emotion, with greatest desire or aversion, and exercise most influence over the will in our present depraved state. Those of Taste have less