aim to recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy China's seat at the UN.

This was the situation in the summer of 1968 when the newly-elected Trudeau Government instructed the Department of External Affairs to review Canada's China policy with a view to finding a basis for establishing relations with the People's Republic of China. These studies were completed in the artumn of 1968, when the general lines of the Canadian approach to negotiations with the People's Republic of China were determined. A basic premise of this approach was reflected in a statement made in a television broadcast in January 1969, when the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that recognition of Peking would imply the "de-recognition of the Taiwan Government as the Covernment of all of China". Public and international interest in Canada's intentions had reached a high level when, on February 10, 1969, Mr. Sharp a mounced in the House of Commons that the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm had been instructed to propose to the Chinese Embassy there the opening of talks on recognition and the exchange of ambassadors. Two days later, the Minister, in reply to a question, said:

I doubt very much that the Canadian Government would recognize or challenge the sovereignty of Peking over Formosa.

This was the first formulation of the position on Taiwan which the Government adhered to throughout the negotiations and which, slightly modified, appears in the Minister's clarifying statement of October 13 announcing the terms of the agreement.

Basic Canadian Position

Also, on February 12, 1969, in reply to a question that Compared Mr. Sharp's statement with a previous statement by Mr. Trudeau, the Minister said:

The Government's policy with respect to the recognition of China has been expressed by the Prime Minister and myself in recent days. That is our policy and if it varies in a y respect from what has been said previously, it varies.

In this way, Mr. Sharp confirmed the Government's recognition of the fact that neither government claiming to represent China would accept any derogation from its exclusive right to speak for all of China and that the impending regotiations would be conducted in that light. Canada would decline to adopt any position on the status of Taiwan but would proceed with negotiations to establish relations with the Chinese government that exercised effective control in the country. This basic position was adopted from the beginning of the regotiations in Stockholm, where the first meeting took place in the Chinese Embassy on February 21, 1969.

On the other aspect of the Taiwan problem, whether the Government in Taipei could continue to be recognized, the Canadian Government's policy also became more precise. On May 29, 1969, for example, Mr. Sharp said:

Canada has a one-China policy and, since the Nationalist Government purports also to be the Government of China, we cannot recognize both Peking and Taiwan at the same time.

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