1332 LATIN AMERICA

819. DEA/4470-40

L'ambassadeur en Yougoslavie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Ambassador in Yugoslavia to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 116

Belgrade, April 19, 1961

SECRET, OPIMMEDIATE from Geneva.

CUBA; SOVIET INTENTIONS

Under-Secretary of State Brilej has told me that they are very worried about possibility that Khrushchev might consider it necessary to take some action to avoid a diplomatic defeat, if Castro should fall, or alternatively defend peaceful co-existence policy against renewed Chinese criticism.

- 2. Brilej said they have information that Warsaw Pact meeting was used to secure support for Khrushchev policy of peaceful co-existence and this was reason for only token of attendance by Chinese and Albanians. Nevertheless Khrushchev had to admit at meeting that he had seriously overestimated USA readiness to accept a détente.
- 3. Brilej said they are worried that Cuba will be another blow to Khrushchev's policies and he may have to react somewhat as he did after failure of Summit meeting in order to protect his own position. Yugoslavs do not repeat not think Russians are likely to intervene in Cuba itself but are afraid they will act elsewhere probably in Laos but possibly also in Berlin. Certain Chinese pressure to do so will be very great.
- 4. To justify belief Russians will not repeat not intervene directly in Cuba Brilej said that at the time of Suez crisis Khrushchev told Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj, then in Moscow, that he would not repeat not risk future of USSR for Nasser. They think this applies even more to Castro.

[R.A.D.] FORD

820.

J.G.D./845/C962-US

Le chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly, to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 926

New York, April 19, 1961

TOP SECRET, CANADIAN EYES ONLY, EMERGENCY.

CUBA - CONVERSATION WITH ADLAI STEVENSON

To be brought immediately to the attention of Prime Minister.

Mr. Stevenson began by emphasizing that he personally and delegation were not repeat not informed on current situation within Cuba itself. It was his impression, principally based on press reports, that rebels established on beachhead were not repeat not making much progress and that hoped-for defections from Castro were sporadic and not repeat not too significant. Report about liberation of political prisoners in Isles of Pines had not repeat not been confirmed.