

*Adjournment Debate*EXTERNAL AFFAIRS—POSSIBILITY RATIFICATION OF
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY BEING REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO
SALE OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

Mr. David MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday last I raised with the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) questions with respect to the sale of nuclear materials and technology to four of the major recipient countries that are presently prospective customers or former customers of ours.

I raised the whole issue of whether our government would require as a basic requirement with respect to a further or future sale of nuclear materials and technology ratification of the non-proliferation treaty. I do not think the Prime Minister fully understood the implications of the question because in his first response to me he seemed to suggest in one instance at least one had already taken place. I trust that the parliamentary secretary has since confirmed that there has been no ratification by any of the four recipient countries.

Miss Bégin: I have news for you.

● (2210)

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I shall be delighted to hear the news from the parliamentary secretary. The last word we had with respect to the four countries, India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Argentina, was that not one ratification had taken place. There appeared to be some preliminary signing by the government of South Korea, but I do not think this has constituted ratification. With respect to the Americans, something approaching 50 per cent of their customers have ratified the non-proliferation treaty. Certainly in this specific instance they are in much better shape than we are.

I am very much concerned, in addition, about the situation with respect to the so-called London Agreement, because of the fact that the London Agreement has never been made public, certainly not by our government. We are getting dribs and drabs of communication with respect to the situation concerning the agreement which has been reached by the seven supplier nations. I think it is terribly important that we get some idea as to the possible action which might be taken with respect to those seven supplier nations; we must know about future policies and what kind of public censure might arise. I say this particularly in view of recent reports in last week's *New York Times* with respect to the growing resentment on the part of the Common Market countries which make up Euratom with regard to the London Agreement.

As I say, we do not know the exact details of that agreement but we are concerned about changes in domestic nuclear policy in the United Kingdom. For some 20 years the government of the United Kingdom has depended for the supply of some basic nuclear materials on the United States. It has depended on that country particularly for the supply of one material, that of tritium, which is a component of H-bombs which is, in turn, derived from many ores although often associated with aluminum.

The speculation in the *New York Times* last week was that there may be some agreement between the government of the United Kingdom and the government of France with respect to the possibility of the development

[Mr. Francis.]

of some new nuclear weapons capability. Certainly the apparent action of the London club in blocking any direct information going to fellow Common Market countries has upset the remaining six. Apparently only late last week were the remaining six European countries informed of the agreement which was reached late last year by the so-called London club.

The essence, I think, of the reason for raising this question has to do with the way in which there will be effective imposition of sanctions. There is no doubt that, as a result of the London meetings, new and stiffer anti-proliferation provisions are to be applied to most nuclear sales agreements around the world. Apparently safeguards are now extended to cover the entire useful life of any nuclear fuel by-product. I believe, however, that tougher standards are still possible, since the London club agreement fell short, I believe, of including the entire nuclear program of recipient nations.

The point which I have made in previous speeches, and will make again tonight, is that the whole question of safeguards does not in any way mean that sanctions will in fact function. Or, as I said in a previous speech outside this House, detection is not prevention. I believe that although safeguard agreements may make reference to the possibility that sanctions may be applied if a nation is caught circumventing agreement provisions, there is no indication from our government as to what sanctions might be enforced, by whom they will be enforced, what the sanctions themselves would be, and what verification procedures beyond those which presently exist would be operable.

We are well aware, I think, that the International Atomic Energy Agency in no way possesses sufficient resources of manpower and operating procedures to achieve the kind of verification which seems to be implied in the London Agreement. If ever there was an instance in which the justification of secrecy was unwarranted, this has to be the clearest example of it. When we think of the immediate and long term implications of the expansion of nuclear information and technology, the great jeopardy occasioned by the growth of nuclear weapons systems, and even the peaceful expansion of nuclear capability, we think there is a definite right for the public to know. I think that both present and future generations of citizens in this world will require that these seven nations, of which Canada is one, must assume a direct and immediate responsibility to make the details of these agreements public.

I have not yet been convinced by any argument so far put forward by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen), or the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Mr. Gillespie) that there is sufficient justification to maintain the kind of secrecy which has existed with respect to the so-called London Agreement. In fact I think secrecy only weakens the capability of our government and other governments to enforce any useful or responsible sanctions. I look forward to hearing from the parliamentary secretary with respect to the questions that I put to the Prime Minister last week.

[Translation]

Miss Monique Bégin (Parliamentary Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, I