

to foment. Moscow cannot develop such links and still isolate her planning procedures and her pricing policy from the eroding influence of a Western world which is far less statist than her own. A capital-poor country cannot endlessly export producer goods without developing an interest in ensuring a return on the investment and, therefore, an interest in stability. I repeat, the Soviet political formula has already proved to be too crude at home. Moscow may be beginning to learn how crude this formula has been abroad.

I have been trying, as fairly and accurately as I can, to present the evidence from a number of different fields that seems to be relevant to an appraisal of Soviet external intentions. As I have suggested, I can see real grounds for optimism in the evidence. But it is important to avoid drawing too large conclusions from such grounds for hope as may be detected. It would be folly to forget the Soviet incursions into Iran immediately after the war, or the brutal extinction of the independence of Czechoslovakia, or the support given to the attack on Korea, or the savage repression of the revolt in Hungary. Above all it would be folly to ignore that if we in the West were to let down our guard, the Soviet Union has it in its power to destroy us. Nor do I know of any evidence to suggest that the present Soviet leaders would hesitate to use any means, including force, to extend the area of Soviet influence and control if that could be done with impunity. On the other hand, the evidence does suggest that they would not be inhibited by the absolutism of Marxist doctrine from adjusting their ambitions and their policy to developing reality.

I must insist, however, that part of that reality is formed by the determination that the West has shown to defend itself and to maintain a military power to deter Soviet aggression. We will not be shaken by any blandishments or by any terror from continuing to contribute to that deterrent power, since we know that in it lies the key to our own security. Today the deterrent power of the West is composed principally of the long-range bombers armed with nuclear weapons which are at the disposal of the United States Strategic Air Command. It is essential, however, that the crucial force be supplemented by an effective air defence throughout North America; and it is for that reason that we in Canada are being called upon to strengthen the defensive system on Canadian soil by installing new means of detecting hostile aircraft, new weapons to bring them down, and a complicated ground environment to ensure that warnings are quickly gathered and interpreted and that orders are quickly transmitted. In a very few years the problem of deterrence may change radically with the advent of the inter-continental ballistic missile. That this will require a new defensive system and new defence expenditures, I have no doubt. But equally, I have no doubt, that Canadians will want to play their part in adjusting the air defence of North America to these new circumstances in order to maintain an effective deterrent against Soviet aggression.