

subsequent consideration. Therefore, while we might be prepared to consider such a commission in principle, we could not possibly do so unless we were sure that we had the same conception of its composition and functions. Unfortunately, however, everything that has been said on this subject by Communist spokesmen leads us to believe that they have in mind not a commission to assist the people of all Korea to express their will but a commission which could be used, as such bodies have been used in other countries, to establish, if not immediate Communist domination, at least so disproportionate a representation of Communists in the government in relation to their actual strength in the country that their programme for seizing power would be vastly strengthened and accelerated. If the Communists consider that we are unduly suspicious or lacking in open-mindedness in this matter, they must ask themselves whether their record of accomplishment in Eastern Europe and of frustrated accomplishment in other countries has not given us strong reasons for scepticism.

Let me again in this connection outline a few of the questions which must be solved before we can talk about agreement in principle. If this all-Korean body is to act only by unanimous decision, the veto power involved will be of crucial importance in connection with the task to be carried out. What exactly do the Communists mean when they say that the body would facilitate "a rapprochement" between the two Koreas? Would this mean that it would act as an interim government or that it would set up an interim government of some kind, or would it be responsible for drafting an all-Korean constitution? How far will the responsibility of the body go in the preparation and conduct of the elections? Would the body be expected to rule upon the acceptability of the candidates and of parties? Would the body be solely responsible for the selection of scrutineers? Would it be responsible for establishing a police force to maintain law and order during the elections or would the international Supervisory Commission assist it in this task? What other functions would the body have? If the body is to have any significant executive powers and is to be more than a negotiating agency for arranging elections, the veto power involved could completely prejudice the freedom of the elections or the establishment of a truly representative government after the elections. It is only if we have settled some of these questions that we can determine whether Mr. Molotov's principle is intended to assist the democratic processes or is merely another sinister manoeuvre of a familiar kind to frustrate the will of the people.

Mr. Molotov's proposal for an agreement on the withdrawal of forces is even more deceptive, because he has endeavoured to gloss over in a subordinate phrase the basic difference which clearly exists between us. This basic difference, which has been frequently stated, is whether the United Nations forces which came to the defence of the Republic of Korea and which want only to assist in the establishment of genuine Korean self-government in accordance with the wishes of the Korean people and then to withdraw, should be treated on the same basis as those forces which came into Korea against the wishes of the Korean people and have sought to assist in establishing in that country a form of government which the majority of the Korean people clearly do not want. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Molotov has attempted to blur this issue by referring to the withdrawal of "American troops" rather than to United Nations troops. We cannot, however, reach agreement in