

RevCon is not the end of the process; further elaboration of the verification regime may be possible at a later stage. He suggests a five year review process; a state party commission with yearly meetings involving state reviews and grave breach provisions allowing for ad hoc verification.

For Western position see the Background above. France and Italy seem to be the most resistant to compromise on verification. Germany at one point after the Jan95 Experts meeting, seemed prepared to cooperate with Canada in preparing a further compromise paper, but later backed off (perhaps because of the common EU position). Netherlands was supportive of reintroducing the Chair's compromise text but not at the beginning of the RevCon. Australia was also willing to support the Chair's resubmission of compromise text. The USA has been largely aloof from this debate.

For the NAM position see the Background above. The hardliners have been most vocal; it might be possible during course of RevCon to persuade some other NAM to join in efforts at a more acceptable compromise on verification.

Russia has pursued its weak state commission proposal. They might be persuaded to support a stronger compromise.

LIKELY AREAS OF COMPROMISE:

Some analysts have suggested that a trade-off may emerge between the issue of the scope of application of the CCW (ie. its expansion to cover internal conflicts) and verification. This is what Canada sought to achieve through the Chair's compromise text of Jan95, without success. Others see a trade-off developing between provisions for technology transfer and verification.