

Part I outlines the social categories of state and non-state actors which create a demand for light weapons. The following list addresses the reasons why proliferation remains a problem:

- 1) weapons provide a means of subsistence (i.e., a form of currency);
- 2) weapons are tools for people who still define themselves as "soldiers" fighting a "war";
- 3) gender identity involves a militarised masculinity;
- 4) racial and ethnic identities are often antagonistically defined;
- 5) violence is accepted as a solution to problems;
- 6) weapons are a symbol of liberation.

In addition, nine groups (state and non-state actors) possess light weapons, and a brief discussion is offered for each: political extremists, criminals, self-defence units, poachers, hunters, mercenaries, private security firms, licensed firearm holders, and security forces.

Part II chronicles the past sources of supply. Original suppliers since 1975 include former Warsaw Pact countries (plus China and Cuba), western countries, and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Several examples are used to illustrate the point that a lack of effective disarmament in post-conflict peace-building is responsible for continued trouble. In addition, inadequate control over new armed formations has resulted in weapons continuing to disappear from armouries. Finally, demobilisation policies have failed to provide for the effective social integration of ex-combatants back into society, thereby continuing a martial culture. Cock concludes that each of these factors continues to ensure that there will be a market for light weapons.

Part III examines the present sources of supply. The illegal arms market is supported by cross border smuggling, illegal imports and leaks from state armouries and security force personnel. The legal arms market is supported by local manufacturers.

Part IV examines potential solutions. White members of the middle class have challenged the idea of a martial culture. Another group, Ceasefire, has been pursuing a national campaign against land mines. Both these groups are part of a necessary effort to transform social norms if efforts at arms control are to be successful. Thirteen other suggestions are made to limit small arms proliferation:

- 1) establish a regional arms register;
- 2) tighten border controls to stop illegal transfers of weapons from Mozambique, Angola and Namibia to South Africa;
- 3) create a stronger criminal justice system and police force;
- 4) legislate heavier penalties for illegal possession of firearms;
- 5) control ammunition stocks more effectively;
- 6) tighten control over state armouries;
- 7) institute bilateral and multilateral commissions to jointly investigate small arms proliferation;
- 8) develop more effective disarmament measures to implement after armed conflicts are settled;
- 9) provide adequate demobilisation policies which allow for the successful re-integration of former combatants into civil society;
- 10) expand the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons;
- 11) educate the citizenry on non-violent forms of conflict resolution;
- 12) formulate a strong and coherent foreign policy;
- 13) develop the local economy.

Cock concludes by emphasizing the link between small arms and social relations. Using Saul Mendlovitz's powerful metaphor "...comparing the arms trade to the slave trade, the challenge is to mobilize a social movement to restructure social and economic relations so that we can, as we did with slavery, despite massive interests and social organization embedded in it, achieve a different social order" (p. 118).

- 505.** Dikshit, Prashant. "Internal Conflict and Role of Light Weapons." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 41-49.

Light weapons are playing a high profile role in current internal conflicts. Small arms are defined according to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition: "...all crew-portable weapons of a calibre less than 50 mm and include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters" (pp. 41-42).