

political pressures in support of military spending reductions. If there is an interest in using ODA as a lever against particular offenders, then there needs to be some objective definition of offender (e.g. a country in which military spending exceeds a certain % of GDP). On the other hand, if the objective is to minimize military spending in all instances and to use ODA to promote a process of global demilitarization, then the instrument is much less likely to be coercive, and more likely to be consultative -- even though the possibility of withholding ODA in the absence of concrete steps toward demilitarization may still be present.

With objectives clarified, e.g. to promote a broad global ethic and practice of demilitarization as distinct from the effort to discipline particular offending countries, attention must turn to the tools available to the international community to induce states to adhere to demilitarization norms and actually follow through on reducing military spending. One focus of the international discussion has been on *conditionality*, but other forms of inducement exist. Nicole Ball identifies three broad categories:¹¹

1. In the first instance, *persuasion* through public declarations and private policy dialogue between donor and recipient states regarding military expenditure and reform options can be augmented by *external support*. "Financial assistance can help governments absorb extra costs associated with reform. Technical assistance can provide skilled manpower or equipment to carry out specific tasks required by reform. Diplomatic support may be necessary to create the political preconditions for significant reductions in military budgets in countries facing major security threats."

2. Additional levels of political and economic *pressure* can be applied without resorting to specific ultimatums or conditions. For example, "by setting expenditure and performance targets in non-military sectors, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are attempting to influence the level of military spending indirectly. Lenders are also experimenting with offering 'carrots' instead of 'sticks.' The Japanese government, for example, plans to

¹¹ Ball, p. 3.