

the region, discussions which, in the end, led nowhere. Despite the large degree of common understanding which exists among WEU nations, this organization found itself unable to act because of significant political differences among its members. That being said, the WEU will continue to develop its capability to undertake certain missions in humanitarian emergencies.

The United States has also promoted the idea of the Africa Crisis Response Force. This initiative proposed the creation a 10,000-strong African force, which would be supported by Western countries through the provision of financing, logistics and intelligence. At the time of the crisis the initiative, which was not fully developed, did not form a basis for action. The USA, in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom, has now presented a modified version (called the Africa Crisis Response Initiative), which focuses on building African capacity through sub-regional organizations, and giving needed attention to political management issues.

These projects are not yet complete, and there are others in varying stages of development. However, these initiatives do not specifically address Chapter VII operations either. The ad-hoc response to the Zaire mission made it clear that these initiatives should be developed and, where appropriate, modified to broaden their application and to improve their effectiveness.

Recommendation 15: Where possible, existing bodies or councils should be used to manage multinational operations. Leadership is easier when the decision-making rules are in place, and where there is a clear understanding of the relative capacity of the members.

Recommendation 15a: Standard legal and administrative arrangements, such as ROE and SOFAs, should be negotiated internationally. Examples of this exist (the UN already has and uses a model SOFA) but the models need to be enlarged.

Recommendation 15b: Existing mechanisms, and those under development (such as the WEU) should be examined to see how they can be used, or adapted for use when the UN or NATO do not mount an operation, particularly for Chapter VII operations. NATO could be asked to examine a broader approach to the use of Combined Joint Task Forces in such crises. We also need to avoid rigidities in the system that unnecessarily inhibit the