

be levied on the Canadian side after reversion. However, the province subsequently refused to accept reversion, mainly because the bridge would have become a charge on the provincial treasury, and the Federal Government was forced to step in and accept the reversion. The National Transportation Act clearly states the principle of user charges, and therefore the Government of Canada is unlikely to enter into an agreement to waive tolls on a bridge following reversion. Furthermore, there is no reason why Canada should be bound by unauthorized agreements made by a province in an area of federal jurisdiction.

The guideline is somewhat confusing with its reference to "regulation of the toll structure" and should perhaps be reworded, since the authority of the Canadian Transport Commission in this area is clearly defined. This leads to the question of whether or not international bridge tolls are a proper matter for the C.T.C. to regulate. Certainly, the regulatory control which the C.T.C. exercises over bridge tolls is not particularly stringent, since it normally only acts in the case of complaints concerning the toll structure and it would seem that these are fairly rare. It may however be desirable that toll levels should be controlled in order to achieve policy objectives, and this cannot be done if the bridges are allowed to set their own rates, subject in most cases to rubber stamp approval by the C.T.C. At the present time, a bridge can make changes in its toll structure to attract traffic, and this could place an undue burden on the highway system. In such cases, it would seem that there should be something more positive than the type of regulation which the C.T.C. is authorized to undertake, and some other agency should be given the power to adjust rates up or down, in order to direct traffic where economically and socially desirable. This would mean that bridge rates were being controlled in the public