

it strengthened the deterrent value of NATO by adding the defensive strength of Greece and Turkey to the organization. On January 21, 1952, the Canadian acceptance of the Protocol was deposited with the State Department, Canada being the second country to take action. There was no doubt by that time that the United States Senate would act affirmatively upon the question. It was now the Canadian turn to express the hope in the Deputies' meeting that other NATO members would complete ratification in order that Greece and Turkey be present as full members at the Lisbon Council meeting, and not merely as observers, as had been necessary at Rome during the November meeting. Ratifications were completed by February 15 and three days later Greece and Turkey formally acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty.

125. During the debate in the House of Commons on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, Mr. Pouliot, in one of his characteristically clever confused speeches, raised the issue of Spanish membership in the following statement:

"In my humble opinion, if we are to have an Atlantic Pact the more members we have the better. If we are to include Turkey and Greece among the Atlantic Pact nations, why not stop and take Spain on the way? What is the objection to Spain? It would be easy to have them with us and they would be an asset. Some people are afraid to talk about Spain. Spain would be a loyal ally. There is no reason for not having Spain".

It is highly probable that in these views the speaker expressed the opinion of most of Quebec, where the appeal of Spain as a Catholic and anti-Communist country is very strong, and where the objections to Franco as the head of a totalitarian state who came to power after a particularly cruel civil war carry far less weight than in other parts of Canada, especially in Labour and C.C.F. circles. It is true that the Spanish Civil War did not as deeply stir public opinion in Canada as in the United Kingdom, France and the United States. As Mr. St. Laurent told Mr. Plevin, during his visit to Ottawa in February, 1951, "apart from a few extremists on both sides, the subject of Spain's relationship with NATO was not of serious political importance in Canada". The Prime Minister believed that, if given time, the Canadian people would accept Spanish adherence to the alliance without very much serious criticism. Nevertheless Canadian relations with Spain have had a chequered character since 1946, arising, as the note in the Minister's Handbook puts it, "from the attitude of the world community as expressed through the United Nations", from the resentment at Franco's pro-Axis "neutrality" during the Second World War, and from its legacy of the Spanish Civil War.

126. Before the Second World War, Canada had formally recognized Franco's government (April, 1939) as the de jure government of Spain, and a Spanish Consul-General was stationed in Montreal. At that time there was no thought of exchanging diplomatic relations. This question was raised by the retiring Spanish Ambassador in London with our High Commissioner in September, 1945. Under instructions from Mr. Robertson, who was in London with the Prime Minister shortly afterwards, Mr. Massey told the Charge d'Affaires that the Canadian Government was "not prepared to receive a diplomatic mission from the present Spanish Government", a decision which was received with "gratification" in the Foreign Office. When the former Consul-General in Montreal, Count de Morales, who had been transferred to Havana, told our Minister in Cuba in June, 1946, that he had in mind coming to Ottawa to discuss with the Canadian Government an exchange of missions, after which, if successful, he would be appointed the