

CSCE needs to adapt to this new landscape featuring the preeminence of the core institutions of the West.

One fallacy which is frequently encountered is to think of the CSCE in terms of a substitute for the core institutions, rather than in terms of a supplement, a mechanism for orchestrating the interplay of partly overlapping and inter-locking institutions. The CSCE will not be able to develop institutional infrastructure to compete with the core institutions. It should not embark upon a course of wasteful duplication but capitalize rather on its unique properties, on being able to shape processes of peaceful change. That ability will depend, however, on an ability to respond to the challenges of a new era rather than to echo its responses to past challenges.

What are the security challenges of the new era? Their precise configuration and manifestation remain wrapped in ambiguity and uncertainty. However, certain propositions or working hypotheses may be advanced. The challenges are rooted in two basic phenomena: a) the break-up of the Soviet Union, b) conflict between ethnicity and the territorial state. There are no institutions available for managing and shaping those processes. They could threaten the institutions containing the present order in Europe.

The specific challenges contained by the two salient phenomena to which I have referred are the following:

- How do we prevent the break-up of the Soviet Union from resulting in a multiplication of the number of nuclear-weapon states which could generate processes of nuclear proliferation threatening the integrity of the non-proliferation regime in Europe and beyond?
- How do we prevent the enormous arsenals of widely dispersed tactical nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union from falling into the violent hands of would-be terrorist groups?