

12. It would in our experience greatly improve the effectiveness of the inspection team if they were assisted in their task by the inclusion of an expert in the activities claimed by the challenged State to be taking place at the challenged facility. This enables a better and earlier assessment to be made of the plausibility of the claims and decisions on where and what to inspect.

Role of challenging State observer

13. The role of the observer from the challenging State is important. Questions to be resolved are whether or not the observer should be able to express his views on the conduct of the inspection to his country's satisfaction; to what extent he is able to influence the inspection plan; whether he can communicate formal requests of the challenged State via the inspection team leader; and what restrictions can be placed by the challenged State on the movement and access of the observer for security reasons. Depending on the answer to these questions one observer might not be enough to cover a seven-day inspection, especially if the inspection team is split into two or more.

Securing the site

14. "Sealing the site" at a large facility with many access points is a difficult task. Should all gates except the main entrance be sealed? Should seals be frangible but with inherent integrity in cases of emergency access gates? Should the main entrance be manned on a 24-hour basis to monitor all movements in and out? Our experience so far suggests the answers to these questions should be yes.

15. In order to prevent the moving of clandestine CW stocks round the site in advance of the inspection team, the team would ideally need to secure and seal transport systems within and from the facility.

Samples

16. There will be a need to define the sampling equipment required at different types of facility. If the inspection team brings all the necessary equipment with it this might include, for liquid and solid samples, sample jars, scoops, ladles, funnels, scrapers, dip sticks, means of cleaning sampling equipment between samples; protective clothing, boots, gloves, overalls; for vapour samples, sorption tubes for later laboratory analysis and draeger tubes. Agreement is also necessary on what equipment the challenged State should be expected to provide, who should take the samples, and where they should be analysed. Our experience suggests that the technical secretariat should provide as much of the equipment as possible and that analysis should be carried out by both the challenged State and the inspectors to guard against fraudulent or faulty analysis. The samples themselves would need to be carefully loaded and sealed.

How to demonstrate that a weapon is not a chemical weapon?

17. A number of possible methods have been considered; it is not clear yet what is most acceptable. For example: