Proposal Abstract C123(A85)

1. **Arms Control Problem:**
   - (a) Conventional weapons – ground forces
   - (b) Nuclear weapons – ballistic missiles
   - (c) Regional arms control – Europe

2. **Verification Type:**
   - (a) On-site inspection – selective
                            – control posts
                            – non-obligatory
   - (b) International exchange of information
   - (c) Remote sensors – aerial

3. **Source:**
   Gellner, Charles R. "Verification Issues in Europe, Including the Attitude of the Warsaw Pact". In A Proxy for Trust: Views on the Verification Issue in Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, pp. 33-44. Edited by John O'Manique. Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, April 1985.

4. **Summary:**
This essay begins by speculating on the attitudes of individual eastern bloc countries to verification and negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). Recent progress in MBFR is also reported, as Soviet proposals now include the principle of on-site inspection of troop reductions during and after they are carried out. Problems remain however, as this inspection is to be voluntary, and may be denied at critical junctures. More general verification problems in MBFR pertain to the secrecy of the proceedings and the difficulties inherent in counting troop levels in large areas where there are rapid or substantial fluctuations in force levels.

Various NATO proposals for the European theatre are then reviewed in the context of verification. Some similarities are noted between the 'associated measures' of MBFR and the Confidence and Security Building Conference (CDE) proposals. Both request advance notification for out-of-garrison activities, and require that outside observers be invited to such activities. They differ, however, in that CDE proposals would impose only a political obligation, and are designed solely to instill confidence. MBFR associated measures, on the other hand, would seek to impose a more stringent 'legal' obligation, and allow for more extensive measures which enhance verification capabilities. Among these are the establishment of permanent entry/exit points for the movement of troops, pre-notification for all major troop movements in the area of