

- (4) Tactical and/or strategic breakout advantages might result in a first-strike capability. NTMs are "more than sufficient" to detect strategic breakout. Similarly, tactical breakouts, such as a breakthrough in ASW which threatened SSBNs, are also unlikely given the use of NTMs.

The author lists several concluding observations:

- (1) There is no prospect that the superpowers will conclude a militarily significant treaty without being satisfied with the compliance/verification aspects.
- (2) There is and will remain minimal prospect, in view of NTMs, that non-compliance could produce significant military advantage for either superpower.
- (3) In periods of low tension, unlike the 1980s, the political significance of compliance assumes less importance.
- (4) It is highly unlikely that superpowers would agree to international monitoring mechanisms of significant military assets including most naval systems. An exception might be zones of peace or nuclear weapons free zones.
- (5) Certain nuclear capabilities including many naval platforms and systems, such as SLCMs, are becoming increasingly difficult to verify by NTMs.
- (6) The prospects of adopting cooperative measures is a function of political climate. The USSR still has a long way to go to accept the need for cooperative systems.
- (7) Specific types of naval arms limitation options and proposals should be assessed in terms of the mix of NTMs and cooperative measures required to verify compliance.