

speaks popularly and according to outward appearance, the deliverance ceases indeed to be arrogant, but only because it has been so eviscerated of relevant meaning as to become frivolous. It is quite true that the Scripture describes man as formed of "dust," rather than of carbonic acid, water, and ammonia; as an upright walker, rather than as a perpendicular mammal vertebrate; as a "living soul," rather than as a cerebral ruminant.

If it were ever desirable or possible to deny the use by Scripture writers of language which is embarrassingly difficult to accept if taken literally, it is certainly no longer so since the lavishly erudite massing of testimony to that effect by President A. D. White, in his articles on the "Warfare of Science." It is soberly true, as he affirms, that the heavens are spoken of by them as having "windows," both the earth and the heavens as having "pillars," the sun as "rising" and "going down," etc. He might have added that the sea is affirmed to have "doors," the waters to contain "chambers" laid upon "beams," the clouds to be made into "chariots," and the wind to have "wings." But if the abandonment of metaphor is the essential condition of "inerrancy" in referring to the facts of nature, it is doubtful if any modern writer can pretend to scientific veracity. Mr. Darwin certainly could not: for his world-famous phrases—"natural selection," "struggle for life," floral "contrivance," the "law of parsimony," and the like, forbid. Mr. Grant Allen, in his choice little "Story of the Plants," just issued, categorically declares that they "learn by the teaching of natural selection" what kind of leaves it is most desirable to produce; that they "take care to throw away no valuable material;" that the trees providently "arrange for the fall of their leaves," in the most wholesome way, etc. He would, no doubt, be surprised to hear that he had therefore been cited as engaged in "warfare" against science; his language plainly reiterating the old Dryadic superstition of the Greeks. Writing in the nineteenth century, when words have immensely multiplied and shaded themselves to exactitude of use, he finds himself compelled, in describing phenomena, to speak phenomenally. This is, in fact, the universal and unchallenged fashion of science. Men talk glibly of straight lines, atoms, ether, as if these were producible to the eye, solid to the scalpel, and imperishably actual. But none know better than themselves that not one of them is demonstrable, even if it be intelligibly possible. Shall we be more exacting of language in its crude archaic poverty, than in its rich development and elaborate refinement of phrase? The word "day," for instance, still has a penumbra of meaning beyond its more specific reference to the time of the earth's revolution on its axis. Is it reasonable to suppose that, when "fingers were used for forks," it was less comprehensive in use?

It is true that the Hebrew expert before referred to informs us that "all people" until "a quarter of a century ago" understood the