to show how completely we have been won to the view that this war, and the transformation of the German people from a beneficent moral force in Europe to a very evil one, is all the work of an idea, of a false philosophy advocated by a few professors and writers. And yet while we are seriously attributing this miraculous power to false ideas, we also apparently assume that similar false ideas will never operate in similar fashion in Russia, Japan, France, or Servia, or in any of the other territories held by our present allies. Such is the belief into which we have managed to talk ourselves, although but yesterday our policy was based on the assumption that the aims of Russia and of France were as aggressive as are the aims inculcated by the German professors.

Let us be honest, at least with ourselves. We know perfectly well that this doctrine, the superlative importance of political and military power, is not German, or even European. It is world-wide. In all powerful nations it lurks, avowed or unavowed, in some degree. Each nation, while giving lip service to the ideals of peace, desires to be more powerful than the rest, to be in a position to impose its will upon its neighbours, convinced that such power is of the very highest value, and that conquest, if it can be rendered secure, will not only add to its prosperity, to its opportunities for trade and "expansion," but also to its dignity. Each holds, in spite of the denunciation of such an ideal in others, the belief that it is a worthy ideal to make the State militarily, politically and territorially great, to have it overtop others. All do to some extent believe that national ideals can and should be promoted not alone by the moral and intellectual forces contained in them, but

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