

19. It is hoped that this "tough" bargaining technique can prove to be an educational process. Soviet negotiators, bred exclusively in totalitarian conditions, are accustomed to take their orders from above, to pursue them as inflexibly as possible, and to avoid compromise except on a quid pro quo basis. This is the reverse of the attitude of easy give-and-take which democratic experience breeds.

20. Mr. George Kennan, the United States Minister in Moscow, has a theory that by the very nature of Soviet (and Communist Party) social structure and traditions their negotiators must inevitably try to obtain all they can in any given negotiations, and yield as little as possible. The United Kingdom Minister, Mr. Frank Roberts, has told me that he shares this view. A further characteristic is that even without definite expansionist objectives there is, as it were, an automatic tendency to fill any political vacuums that may exist, unless constantly and consciously restrained. This theory, while here stated in over-simplified form, seems to have a considerable amount of truth in it. Mr. Harriman, United States Ambassador, who over a protracted period has experimentally given more optimistic and generous interpretations every opportunity to justify themselves, has told me that he has been forced to concede the substantial correctness of such an analysis.

21. The corollaries are that the western democracies should i) carefully avoid political vacuums in areas in which they are interested; ii) should, as Mr. Kennan puts it, maintain constantly a moderate and flexible pressure; and iii) should adopt realistic "horse-trading" or bargaining methods as the technique of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

22. There is every reason to believe that such firmness will in the short run prove successful. There are also grounds for hoping that in the long run such an "educational" policy might induce a more basically cooperative and less exclusive, or isolationist, attitude on the part of the Soviet Union.

23. There are almost certainly men in top Soviet policy councils including the Politburo, who desire a more liberal and cooperative policy with the democracies. But if these men are to dare to speak up their arguments must be based on tangible and obvious material benefits to the Soviet Union - benefits sufficiently obvious and immediate to counteract the essentially exclusive and uncooperative traditions of Leninist theory and of Communist Party practice. A sensitive and flexible western policy of firmness against firmness, immediate benefit only against benefit - which would always welcome cooperation but give Soviet leaders no grounds for believing that western statesmen and diplomats are "suckers" - is probably the only way of inducing, on a permanently reliable basis, such cooperation from the Soviet Union.

24. Such a firmly flexible policy would probably have to be carried on for a considerable period of time to come. The Soviet Government has more than once demonstrated the ease with which it can make basic reverses in major policy, and its concern internally always to keep a free hand. It is moreover clear that Soviet internal policy is to emphasize military training and preparedness. It may therefore seem desirable for the western powers not only to be ready to apply pressure or make concessions flexibly, as Soviet policy from time to time warrants, but to take care constantly to have a safe preponderance of weight and of bargaining counters in democratic hands.